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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of CEO Option Grants on Firm Value:  Determinants of the Effectiveness 
of Option Grants. (December 2006) 
Catherine Krueger Weber, B.A., University of Richmond; 
M.B.A., Duke University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Robert H. Strawser 
 Dr. K. Sivaramakrishnan 
 
The significance of stock options as a component of executive compensation 
has fluctuated dramatically over the past decade. The purpose of this study is to inves-
tigate determinants of the effectiveness of stock option grants. These option grants are 
considered to be effective if they accomplish their intended role of enhancing firm 
value by inducing risk-taking behavior. 
Using data from 2,349 firms that granted stock options to their Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) between 1992 and 2001, the relationship between the options granted 
and subsequent firm value was examined. This study found no universal positive asso-
ciation between option grants and firm value. However, CEO incentive equilibrium, 
defined as stability in the CEO’s stock and option portfolio sensitivity to stock price, 
was found to influence the association between stock option grants and firm value. The 
positive association between grants and firm value was evidenced for the sub-sample 
of firms that demonstrate disequilibrium in CEO incentives. This was not the case, 
however, for the CEO incentive equilibrium sub-sample. This finding indicates that the 
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positive valuation impact of stock option grants is highest for those firms that demon-
strate a trend of increasing CEO portfolio sensitivity to stock price.  
High CEO portfolio sensitivity to equity risk was not found to interact with 
grant sensitivity to equity risk in a manner that reduces firm value. Thus, this study did 
not find support for the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, grants further reduce CEO di-
versification, and interact with portfolio sensitivity to reduce incentives for risk-taking. 
Consistent with Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991), however, a high level of un-
correlated wealth is found to interact with grant sensitivity to equity risk so as to in-
crease the positive impact of grant sensitivity on firm value. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION

 
The significance of stock options as a compensation instrument has fluctuated 
dramatically over the past decade. Between 1992 and 2000, stock option grants to S&P 
500 CEOs increased from $11 billion to $119 billion. However by 2002, this total had 
fallen to $71 billion (Hall and Murphy 2003). Contemporaneous with this fluctuation in 
the amount of stock option grants awarded, research findings on the value of stock op-
tions are somewhat mixed. The decline in the importance of stock options as a com-
pensation instrument has been accompanied by a body of research finding that stock 
options may be an inefficient way to compensate executives. However, the instance of 
stock option awards continues to exceed pre-1992 levels, and analytical research using 
agency models continues to demonstrate the value to shareholders of an option-based 
compensation contract.  
A primary objective of the inclusion of stock options in executive compensation 
is to increase firm value by inducing corporate stewards to pursue risky investments.1  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate determinants of the effectiveness of stock 
option grants. Stock option grants are said to be effective if they accomplish their in-
tended role of enhancing firm value by inducing risk-taking behavior.  
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review.  
1 Owners of the firm are assumed to be risk-neutral; i.e. not risk-seekers. They are not interested in increased risk for 
its own sake, but are interested in the best possible investment selection. Additional risk that may be involved in 
pursuit of the project with the highest net present value is irrelevant. 
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Examining the effectiveness of stock options in generating risk-taking incen-
tives is important in light of the significant percentage of compensation that options 
continue to represent, as well as their high visibility as a form of compensation. Be-
tween 1992 and 1996, for manufacturing firms, stock options as a percent of total ex-
ecutive compensation increased from 27% to 36%. This increase represented a 
doubling of stock option pay, in dollar terms (Murphy 1999). As a result of the sub-
stantial and highly publicized increases in stock option compensation, their impact on 
corporate performance came under increased scrutiny. Corporate scandals of the late 
1990s (e.g. Enron and WorldCom) were linked to excessive stock option compensa-
tion. This attribution imposed substantial political costs on firms that granted options to 
CEOs, and fueled a decline in the instances of stock option grants. Certain firms, of 
which Microsoft is a notable example, have been highly publicized and praised for dis-
continuing stock option grants in favor of restricted stock grants. Yet, the question re-
mains unresolved as to the role of stock options in adding value to a firm.  
The effectiveness of a stock option grant will depend on how the recipient val-
ues it. Lambert, Larcker, and Verrechia (1991 hereafter LLV) indicate that CEOs value 
stock option compensation differently than do shareholders. A CEO’s valuation of a 
stock option is largely a function of his or her overall compensation structure. In fact, 
LLV suggest that depending on the incentive effects generated by other components of 
the CEO’s compensation package, stock option grants may not always be effective in 
inducing risk-taking behavior. Motivated by these arguments, this paper presents an 
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empirical investigation into the effectiveness of stock option grants after controlling for 
the incentive effects of other components of a compensation portfolio. 
Guay (1999) examines how stock option grants influence the sensitivity of ex-
ecutive compensation to equity risk. He presents a cross-sectional study demonstrating 
that stock options significantly increase the sensitivity of the CEO’s compensation to 
equity risk, and that this sensitivity is positively related to firms’ investment opportuni-
ties and the standard deviation of stock returns. Taken together, these observations are 
consistent with the notion that, on average, stock options are associated with increased 
value-maximizing risk-taking behavior. However, as emphasized earlier, the effective-
ness of individual stock option grants can only be determined in conjunction with other 
components of CEO compensation. 
It is reasonable to expect that an efficient compensation committee will be cog-
nizant of the incentive impact of the various components of a CEO’s compensation 
package when granting new stock options. This study assumes that a compensation 
committee awards options in such a manner as to generate a desired level of incentive, 
with incentives measured in terms of sensitivity to equity risk. This assumption about 
the compensation committee is central to this study. If this assumption does not hold, if 
compensation committees grant options without accurate consideration of the resultant 
portfolio incentives held by the CEO, then this study is biased against finding a rela-
tionship between grants and returns. Further discussion of the implications for this 
study if the maintained assumption does not hold is provided in the Conclusions, Chap-
ter VIII. 
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All else being equal, a committee would grant options to achieve one of two ob-
jectives. The grant could be designed to offset a decrease in risk-taking incentives aris-
ing from changes in the CEO’s portfolio (e.g., when a CEO exercises previously 
granted stock options). Alternatively, the grant could be intended to increase the overall 
incentive for risk-taking. This argument, that options are granted to achieve one of the 
two aforementioned objectives, is based on two crucial assumptions. First, it assumes 
that compensation committees are efficient and able to correctly assess the incentive 
effects of the various components of a compensation package. Second, it assumes that 
options are granted only for their incentive effects. Under these two assumptions, op-
tion grants are unlikely to be associated with a decrease in risk-taking behavior. 
The empirical evidence of Core and Guay (1999) that options are granted so as 
to maintain an optimal level of exposure to stock price in CEO compensation, suggests 
that on average, compensation committees are efficient in approaching optimal levels 
of CEO incentives. In their study, optimal equity incentives in a CEOs portfolio are 
modeled as a function of market value, idiosyncratic risk, investment opportunities, 
free cash flow risk, and CEO tenure. Option grants are then modeled as a function of 
the residual from the above incentive model as well as firm specific variables that are 
hypothesized to influence option grants. They find a significant negative association 
between option grants and the residual from the incentive model, indicating that grants 
are awarded in order to move the stock option incentives toward an optimal level. 
However, given LLV’s argument that the overall portfolio of compensation invest-
ments should be considered simultaneously with the grant decision to determine the 
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incentive effects of stock option grants, a stronger test of the argument for compensa-
tion committee efficiency is to examine the effectiveness of stock option grants on a 
firm-by-firm basis, including interaction between option grants and other components 
of CEO compensation. This study contributes this important extension to the body of 
research on CEO compensation incentives. 
There are other reasons a firm may offer stock options; for example, 1) to re-
cruit or retain high-demand CEOs in a competitive market where stock options are a 
standard practice; 2) to replace cash compensation for firms with binding liquidity con-
straints; 3) to minimize tax consequences of compensation; or 4) to avoid the political 
cost that may be associated with more visible forms of executive pay. In their analysis, 
Core and Guay acknowledge and control for alternative objectives of stock options. 
Regardless of the reason for granting an option, however, the attendant incentive im-
pact of the grant cannot be ignored. 
This study assesses the incentive impact of stock options through the relation-
ship between option grants and stock price. The disclosure of stock option grant data 
influences investor expectations regarding managerial actions in response to the stock 
option incentives. It takes a significant amount of time for investment incentives to 
come to fruition. Project selection, investment, and development are required before 
returns from the investment are realized. Even then, the project may or may not gener-
ate the expected returns. Measuring the impact of option grants based on the outcome 
of investment projects undertaken is impractical. The length of time between option 
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grant and investment fruition, and the possibility of failed investment projects will sig-
nificantly limit the power of tests of the hypothesis.  
Semi-strong form efficient capital markets assess the impact of CEO compensa-
tion upon disclosure of the information. Many recent studies question the validity of 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis, hereafter EMH.2 To the extent that the market is 
somewhat efficient, however, and there is some relationship between option grant dis-
closure and stock price, this study should note a significant relationship between the 
disclosure of grant sensitivity information and returns measured subsequent to the dis-
closure. The assumption underpinning this study is that a weak form EMH is main-
tained.  
Core and Guay's analysis does not address the impact of stock options on firm 
value. A reasonable expectation is that achievement of an optimal compensation con-
tract is associated with increased firm value. Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kaznik 
(2000) find a positive stock price reaction following stock option grants. Since stock 
option grants are not immediately disclosed, short-horizon returns are somewhat diffi-
cult to interpret. However, Yermack finds consistently positive cumulative abnormal 
stock returns (CARs) beginning at 10 days following a grant up through 120 days fol-
lowing the grant, even though disclosure lags behind the grant by approximately three 
months, and in some instances, by as much as 15 months. 
Hanlon, et al (2003) estimate that $3.71 in future Operating Income is associ- 
ated with one dollar of Black-Scholes option value granted. Aboody (1996), however, 
____________ 
2 Shiller (2003) traces the evolution of economic thought from EMH to behavioral finance. Kothari (2001) addresses 
the implications of a maintained assumption of market efficiency for accounting research, and discusses recent re-
search testing the EMH in the context of accounting information. 
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 finds that a dollar of stock option value reduces firm value by $1.35, when stock op-
tions are valued using a modified binomial model, suggesting that the dilution effects 
outweigh the incentive impact of stock options.  
A reason for mixed results regarding the relationship between stock option 
grants and firm value is the nature of the association between CEO compensation, a 
firm's investment opportunity set (IOS), and firm value. It seems reasonable to assume 
that these three components are endogenously determined in equilibrium. All else 
equal, stability in the level of CEO incentives is an indicator that the firm may be in an 
equilibrium state. 
These observations call attention to a direction to follow in examining the im-
pact of stock option grants—delineate firms that are “stable” in terms of CEO incen-
tives from those that are in disequilibrium, or “trending”.3   “Stable” firms are those 
that demonstrate a stable sensitivity to stock price in the CEOs portfolio before and af-
ter stock option grants,4 and “trending” firms are those exhibiting consistently increas-
ing sensitivities in these portfolios5. A third category of firms, designated “temporal 
trend,” includes those where the CEO’s portfolio sensitivity may fluctuate dramatically 
____________ 
3 In this dissertation, the terms “stable sensitivity” and “equilibrium” are used synonymously. Similarly, “trending” 
and “disequilibrium” are terms used interchangeably.  
4 Stable sensitivity in the CEOs portfolio of incentives is defined as one that does not increase or decrease by more 
than 10% over the three year horizon from the beginning of the year of the grant to the end of the year following 
disclosure of the grant sensitivity information. The mean sensitivity at the end of year 3 is within 10% of the mean 
sensitivity at the beginning of the year of the grant.  Chapter V, Methodology, contains a schematic of the time-
lines over which this equilibrium is measured,  
5 The Core and Guay (1999) optimal contract analysis is based on portfolio sensitivity to stock price. The focus in 
this study is the risk incentives in stock option grants, which suggests that an equilibrium analysis based on portfo-
lio sensitivity to equity risk might be more appropriate here. The results of the empirical analysis in this study are 
essentially the same, regardless of the sensitivity metric employed, however. Therefore, consistent with prior re-
search, the results presented are based on equilibrium portfolio sensitivity to stock price.  
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during the period of investigation, but over the horizon in its entirety remains un-
changed, as well as firm years where incentives decline. 
The hypothesis that option grants will have a significant impact on firm value 
for “trending,” or disequilibrium, firms is tested. It is predicted that the sensitivity of 
these option grants will be positively associated with firm value for “trending” firms. 
The strength and direction of this association depend on the incentive effects of other 
components of the CEO’s existing compensation portfolio, however. Therefore, as 
LLV suggest, this study tests the hypotheses that (i) option grant incentives are likely 
to result in greater risk-taking, and thus increase firm value, when the fixed compensa-
tion in the existing portfolio is higher; and (ii) the impact of option grant incentives is 
likely to be muted by a higher level of stock-based compensation in the existing com-
pensation portfolio. 
A direct assessment of the effectiveness of stock options in inducing risk-
related increases in firm value requires a measure of “risk-taking.” Under the EMH, 
current price is market value, and therefore a proxy for firm value.  This study exam-
ines whether the increase in market value, the return on the stock subsequent to option 
grants, reflects stock market expectations for increased value due to risk-taking by 
CEOs.6 Of particular interest in measuring investment risk-taking is the ability of the 
measure to capture the level of future growth opportunities available to the firm. Ex-
____________ 
6 This approach is in the spirit of Tufano (1996) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) who used the level of risk man-
agement, namely hedging and insurance programs, that were implemented in the gold mining industry and the 
riskiness of development projects in the oil and gas industry, respectively, as proxies for managerial risk-taking. 
Both studies found an association between managerial risk-taking and the stock option component of a CEO’s 
portfolio. However, neither study examines how the other compensation components affect this association, nor 
does either address the valuation implications of this association.  
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panding the set of available growth opportunities, either by increasing the number of 
investment opportunities, or increasing the scope of a smaller number of projects, 
represents investment risk taken in order to advance potential growth in firm value.  
It is important to recognize that corporate stewards, by way of their experience 
and expertise, are in a position to both identify and influence the firm’s growth oppor-
tunities. The firm value contributed by real investment options represents an invest-
ment decision variable for the CEO (Baker 1993). This study examines the role  of 
option grants as determinants of firm characteristics, where the characteristic of the 
firm (in this case, returns) are determined by stock option compensation. Other studies 
have investigated a similar directional hypothesis.7 This is a different directional hy-
pothesis from empirical studies (Gaver and Gaver 1993a, 1993b; Guay 1999; 
Janakiraman 1998; Smith and Watts 1992; Yermack 1995), which have investigated 
the determinants of option compensation. In general, these studies found that compen-
sation boards of firms with higher growth opportunities are more likely to grant stock 
options.8 Both of these directional influences can coexist; however, the focus of the 
current study is examination of the impact of CEO stock option grants on a subsequent 
measure of firm value. 
This study contributes to the compensation and incentives literature by provid-
ing evidence on the impact of option grant sensitivity on firm value. Prior work has 
____________ 
7 For example, Hanlon et al. (2003), examines the impact of stock option grants on the subsequent Operating Income 
of a firm. 
8 Guay (1999) observes that “Since risk-related investment problems are expected to be greatest for firms with sub-
stantial investment opportunities, the magnitude of convexity in executives’ wealth-performance relation is ex-
pected to be positively related to the proportion of assets that are growth options”. One exception to the general 
finding is that of Yermack (1995). The Yermack study does not find a significant positive relationship between a 
firm’s investment opportunity set and option grants. 
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investigated the relationship between portfolio sensitivity to equity risk and firm char-
acteristics. However, compensation committees manage incentives through grants, and 
this study contributes evidence regarding the impact of these grants. In addition this 
study empirically investigates the relationship between firm value and the interaction 
of option grants and incentive equilibrium in the CEO’s portfolio, to identify whether 
the incentive equilibrium status of the portfolio moderates the relationship between 
stock option grants and firm value. A third contribution of this study is the develop-
ment of  empirical evidence in support of the analytical findings of LLV, that portfolio 
considerations of correlated and non-correlated wealth have an impact on the incentive 
value of an option grant. 
This study does not find that CEO option grants are universally associated with 
increased stock price subsequent to the option grants  However, in the presence of in-
centive disequilibrium, where CEO portfolio incentives are increasing over time, a 
positive association between option grants and subsequent returns is documented. 
The sensitivity of option grants is found to be associated with firm value across 
all firms in the sample. This result is driven, however, by the firms that are in incentive 
disequilibrium. For firms with stable levels of CEO incentives, this relationship is not 
noted.  A significant interaction between the sensitivity of option grants and that of the 
CEO’s portfolio is not found. However, consistent with LLV (1991), the sensitivity of 
an option grant is found to have a greater impact on firm value when the CEO has 
greater unrelated wealth. 
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Further tests, tabulated in this paper, find that the relationship between portfolio 
and grant incentives is dependent on the equilibrium status of the CEOs portfolio. For 
CEOs with portfolio sensitivities that consistently trend upward, a significant interac-
tion between grant and portfolio sensitivities is noted. In all this study highlights the 
importance of CEO portfolio characteristics in assessing the incentive value of an op-
tion grant. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a 
survey of related literature. In Chapter III, the hypotheses of this research are devel-
oped. In Chapters IV and V the data and research sample are described, and the meth-
odology is explained, respectively. Chapter VI presents the results, and Chapter VII 
discusses sensitivity analyses performed on these results. Chapter VIII presents the 
conclusion, and identifies areas and issues for future research.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The increased level of stock option compensation that has been awarded to 
CEOs of U.S. corporations in the 1990s has been accompanied by a proliferation of 
research on stock options by accounting, finance and management academics. A desire 
to understand the objectives, characteristics and impact of stock options has generated 
this increase in research attention. The following review of significant papers address-
ing stock options will focus on papers addressing, in turn, the rationale for stock op-
tions, evidence about the impact of options on achieving their goal, and evidence 
regarding the impact of executive stock options on shareholder value. The final section 
of this review will track the evolution of the measurement of stock option compensa-
tion. 
The Rationale for Stock Option Compensation 
The rationale for stock option compensation is found in the agency model of the 
firm.9 In the basic agency model, the owner of a firm hires an agent to whom he dele-
gates decisions about resource allocation. An effort-averse agent will require compen-
sation from the owner of a firm to provide this managerial service. While there are 
multiple layers of principal-agent contracts within a firm, this research focuses on the 
contract between a firm's board of directors (the principal) and the CEO.  
____________ 
9 Baiman (1982; 1990) provides surveys of early literature in agency theory that has applications to accounting. 
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The inherent divergence of interests between the owner and the agent he hires 
generates tension in this relationship. The owner of the firm is risk neutral, and prefers 
a high level of effort by the agent. The agent is both risk- and effort-averse. The differ-
ence in preference for effort is addressed by compensation to the agent commensurate 
in value to the cost of effort expended. This would be simple enough if the principal 
were able to observe the effort expended. Since such is rarely the case, compensation is 
frequently based on observable output. This asymmetry in information regarding agent 
effort gives rise to the problem generated by differences in risk preference.  
Standard models of the agency problem assume that an agent's effort increases 
output in terms of first-order stochastic dominance. An increase in the level of an 
agent's effort is assumed to result in a shift to the right in the resulting distribution of 
output. The stochastic nature of the relationship between agent effort and outcome in-
creases the cost of agent effort. The expected benefit to an agent of a given level of ef-
fort is reduced by both the cost of the effort, and a risk premium, which adjusts the 
expected benefit downward for the risk that effort may be expended with little or no 
improvement in outcome. 
Holmstrom (1979) developed a seminal model of the principal-agent problem. 
In the absence of risk-aversion on the part of the agent, the first-best solution to the 
agency problem is for the principal to sell the firm to the agent for its expected value. 
The risk-averse agent, however, will only pay the expected value less a risk premium. 
Thus, they will be unable to negotiate a price for the transaction. 
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The principal can shield a risk-averse agent from the risk of the firm by bearing 
all risk himself. This is achieved through a constant-wage contract. An example of this 
would be the CEO who receives strictly cash compensation.10 Even here, however, the 
principal cannot shield the agent from human capital risk (Holmstrom et al. 1986). This 
first-best solution assumes that the principal can observe the effort supplied by the 
agent, and that a forcing contract can be implemented that pays a flat wage based on 
the agent's acceptable level of effort. When the agent effort is unobservable, as is the 
case with CEOs, the first-best solution is no longer optimal. A flat wage in the presence 
of unobservable effort leads to agent shirking. 
Holmstrom (1979) demonstrated the superiority of the second-best solution in 
this case. When agent effort is unobservable, the optimal contract imposes some level 
of risk on the agent to encourage a higher level of effort. The optimal level of risk-
sharing increases as the marginal return to the firm of agent effort increases. When 
agent effort makes a difference, as is assumed to be the case for CEOs, some level of 
risk-sharing is optimal. 
Lambert (1986) pointed out a significant limitation of the standard agency 
model particularly relevant to the model as applied to CEO compensation contracts. A 
key assumption in the basic model is that agent effort shifts the distribution of out-
comes to the right in terms of first-order stochastic dominance. The conventional 
model does not take into account that the effort desired by the principal from an agent 
could involve project selection as well as project execution. Such expectations are 
____________ 
10 This is a relatively rare case. 
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clearly the case for CEOs. The importance of project selection in the principal-agent 
model is the potential for project selection to introduce changes in the variance of out-
comes. Projects with different amounts of risk, as measured by the variance in potential 
outcomes, cannot be ranked in terms of stochastic dominance. CEOs are assumed to be 
risk-averse, and to select projects based on personal financial interests. Therefore, it is 
likely that a CEO would select a project with a lower expected value and lower risk 
while the risk-neutral principal would prefer a competing project with higher expected 
value but higher risk. To the risk-neutral principal, the increased risk is irrelevant to the 
decision process. Lambert (1986) shows that under standard utility function assump-
tions, this project selection rule will result in underinvestment, defined as failure of the 
CEO to pursue positive net present value (NPV) projects. This finding highlights the 
importance of a compensation contract that aligns the risk preferences of the CEO and 
the owners of the firm to mitigate underinvestment. 
The Impact of Stock Option Compensation on Risk-Taking 
Research has established a positive relationship between firm size and compen-
sation (Murphy 1999; Rosen 1992; Yermack 1995). A larger firm is assumed to be 
more complex and have greater demands on the capabilities of the CEO. A larger firm 
will require a more talented CEO, and hence, must pay more, consistent with micro-
economic theory, which requires that the marginal cost of an input equal its marginal 
product in equilibrium. 
Smith and Watts (1992) is among the first papers to address the determinants of 
firm compensation policy including incentive compensation. They found that, control-
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ling for accounting return, CEO salary and stock option compensation is positively as-
sociated with the firm's investment opportunity set, while bonus compensation is in-
versely related. Theirs is an industry-level study, which excludes regulated industries. 
Compensation is measured as the median CEO salary in the industry. Incentive com-
pensation is measured as 1) the percent of firms in the industry offering bonus plans 
and 2) the percent of firms in the industry that offer stock-option plans. Smith and 
Watts assumed that all firms had access to the same stakeholders and contracting tech-
nology. Three factors create cross-sectional differences in firm compensation, namely, 
taxes (tax rationale), regulation (regulatory rationale), and the specific set of invest-
ments that each firm develops (contracting rationale). Smith and Watts tested and 
found support for only the contracting rationale, or the size of the investment opportu-
nity set, as an explanatory variable for CEO compensation. A larger set of investment 
opportunities will require greater effort on the part of the CEO to 1) evaluate options to 
prioritize exercise and 2) to exercise real options. Since information about the value of 
real options is unavailable to owners of the firm, agency conflict is positively associ-
ated with the size of the set of real options. 
Gaver and Gaver (1993a) conducted a firm-level study following Smith and 
Watts (1992). This study produced additional support for the finding that CEO cash 
compensation and the incidence of stock option plans are positively associated with the 
size of a firm's investment opportunity set, after controlling for size. Gaver and Gaver 
measure the investment opportunity set using a factor score based on six parameters 
that are standard proxies for firm value, risk and growth. 
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Following Gaver and Gaver (1993a), Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996, 
hereafter BJK) studied the relationship between changes in compensation and the firm's 
investment opportunity set. They found that, while not directly associated with total 
change in CEO pay, a firm's investment opportunity set is a moderating variable in the 
relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. A greater investment opportunity 
set increases the sensitivity of compensation to stock performance. BJK used a factor 
score to operationalize the firm investment opportunity set; however, they employed 
somewhat different measures to create the factor score.  
Baker (1993) questioned the results of the Gaver and Gaver study based on the 
relationship it found between firm size and investment opportunity set. Baker found the 
Gaver and Gaver (1993a) result that high-growth firms are the larger firms in terms of 
asset size counterintuitive. Notwithstanding Baker's questions, Gaver and Gaver and 
BJK both found support for a relationship between firm size and CEO compensation 
when firm size is measured in such a way that it is correlated with the size of the firm's 
investment opportunity set. Baker (1993) pointed out that, contrary to being an exoge-
nous factor, the investment opportunity set is a choice variable for the firm. This choice 
is the critical notion that links the analytical research of Lambert (1986) with the em-
pirical research demonstrating the relationship between incentive compensation and the 
size of a firm's investment opportunity set.11 There is endogeneity in the system of 
CEO pay, firm investment selection, and the size of the firm's investment opportunity 
____________ 
11 Other studies that find a positive association between the investment opportunity set and firms' use of stock op-
tions are Lewellen et al. (1987), Matsunaga (1995), and Mehran (1995). However, Bizjak et al. (1993) and Yer-
mack (1995) find a negative association between stock options and the investment opportunity set. 
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set. Empirical research provides evidence that pay is contingent on the size of the in-
vestment opportunity set. Analytical research indicates that project selection, and, 
therefore, the size of a firm's investment opportunity set, may be influenced by charac-
teristics of the CEOs compensation scheme. In particular, the importance of risk-
sharing highlights the significance of equity-based pay in a CEOs compensation portfo-
lio.  
Alignment of risk preferences is the theoretical argument for paying CEOs in-
centive compensation. Incentive pay can take one of two basic forms, namely restricted 
stock awards or stock option grants. This statement vastly oversimplifies the broad ar-
ray of compensation options available to compensation committees;12 however, it en-
ables enumeration of the important distinctions between two major forms of incentive 
pay. The unique characteristics of stock options as opposed to restricted stock awards 
highlight some of the interesting differences in the incentives provided by the two 
forms of compensation. 
Smith and Stultz (1985) examined the differences in stock versus option incen-
tives in the context of a manager's hedging choices. Hedging is defined as the reduction 
in variance of investment outcomes through the acquisition of financial assets. Smith 
and Stultz found that if the CEO's end-of-period wealth is a concave function of end-
of-period firm value, then the CEO will hedge the firm completely. If the end-of-period 
wealth is a convex function , but utility, i.e., preferences for lotteries, is a concave 
function of firm value, then the CEO will conduct partial hedging. (Risk-aversion im-
____________ 
12 See, for instance, Kole (1997). 
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plies a concave utility function.) However, if the CEO utility function is a convex func-
tion of firm value, as may be induced with compensation instruments that promote 
risk-seeking such as bonuses or stock options, the CEO will behave as a risk-seeker 
and will find zero hedging to be optimal. Thus, the more option-like features of a com-
pensation portfolio, the less hedging will be optimal for the CEO. The essential contri-
bution of stock options to a compensation portfolio is the convexity in the relationship 
between the CEO's utility and the value of the firm. 
Guay (1999) furthered the notion of convexity in a CEOs compensation con-
tract, by calculating the convexity of a compensation portfolio and finding it positively 
associated with the size of a firm's investment opportunity set. Guay measures convex-
ity as the partial derivative of an option's Black-Scholes value with respect to stock-
return volatility. While the convexity measure he calculated for stock option portfolios 
is significantly different from zero, he finds that the convexity for a restricted stock 
portfolio is not significantly different from zero. A share of stock is deemed to be a call 
option of the value of the firm, and thus Guay uses an implicit valuation in his analysis 
of the convexity of restricted stock. 
The difference in incentives between a share of restricted stock and a call op-
tion is further examined by Feltham and Wu (2001). They modeled the cost to share-
holders of generating a given level of effort through stock shares versus the cost of 
generating the same effort with on-the-money stock options and found that when the 
agent's ability to influence the risk of the terminal value of the firm is low, stock shares 
are more efficient. When the agent has a high ability to influence variance in the termi-
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nal value of the firm, however, such as is the case with CEOs, options become more 
effective (i.e., options cost less to generate a given level of effort). Along the same 
lines, Lambert and Larcker (2004) found that for most parameters of CEO risk-
aversion, the optimal contract is either partly or totally option-based; a compensation 
scheme based strictly on restricted stock is generally sub-optimal.  
With respect to increasing the risk preferences of the agent, debate continues as 
to the effectiveness of stock options. Empirical evidence exists to support the hypothe-
sis that stock option compensation increases an agent’s managerial risk-taking behavior 
(DeFusco et al. 1990; Garvey and Mawani 2005; Guay 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin 
2002; Tufano 1996). However, arguments against this conclusion are also persuasive. 
Carpenter (2002) finds conditions under which giving a manager more options induces 
a reduction in asset volatility as a result of the leverage inherent in the manager’s stock 
options. Analysis by Ross (2004) finds that for generally assumed preferences, call op-
tions do not make agents less risk-averse. The convexity that makes a risky bet more 
desirable can be more than offset by the other effects of the options that 1) move the 
evaluation of the bet to a new, possibly more risk-averse, section of the utility function, 
and 2) magnify the delta in the CEOs total compensation package created by additional 
options. These findings once again highlight the importance of a CEO’s wealth and 
position vis-à-vis the risk-aversion portions of the utility function in attempting to as-
sess the impact of stock options on a CEOs preferences for risk. Furthermore, Ross 
emphasizes the magnification of the bet that is imposed by the incremental addition of 
stock options. 
 21 
Other Reasons for Stock Option Grants  
Empirical analysis of the effectiveness of stock options would be simplified if 
the rationale for stock options were restricted to incentives for effort or risk-taking in 
project selection. There are a number of other reasons compensation committees grant 
stock options, however. Many of these reasons have been tested and found to have de-
scriptive validity as explanatory factors in stock option compensation.  
The problem of the investment horizon is related to underinvestment. CEOs 
may be expected to have a shorter investment horizon than owners of the firm. Dechow 
and Sloan (1991) found that executives in their later years spend less on research and 
development, in an effort to improve short-term earnings. They found, however, that 
stock and option ownership mitigate this relationship. In related research, Llewellen et 
al. (1987) found that the age of an executive is positively associated with the incidence 
of stock-related compensation; however subsequent research has failed to demonstrate 
a significant relationship between stock option awards and CEO age (Yermack 1995). 
Use of CEO age is an alternate specification of the investment-horizon hypothesis. 
Several studies have examined the relationship between the fraction of firm eq-
uity held by the CEO and the incidence of stock option grants. Theory would suggest 
an inverse relationship, with greater CEO ownership resulting in a lower requirement 
for additional equity grants. Mehran (1995) found the hypothesized negative associa-
tion. Llewellen et al. (1987), Matsunaga (1995), and Yermack (1995) failed to find a 
significant relationship, however. Haubrich (1994) and Hall and Liebman (1998) dem-
onstrated that even small ownership percentage can provide incentives, providing fur-
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ther rationale for the absence of a significant relationship between CEO equity hold-
ings as a percent of total equity and stock option grants. Core and Guay (1999) found 
that CEO holdings are, under certain conditions, inversely associated with equity 
awards. The variables in their study were constructed to measure incentives rather than 
proportional ownership, however. 
Yermack (1995) investigated liquidity as a rationale for stock option grants, 
with liquidity operationalized using dividend payment data. Yermack found the hy-
pothesized negative association between liquidity and stock option grants. Firms use 
options to compensate CEOs when cash constraints are binding. Lambert, et.al. (1987) 
pointed out that managers are in a position to influence the value of options through 
dividend policy. Their research found that dividends are lower following adoption of a 
stock option plan. 
Lambert and Larcker (1987) found that the relative use of market-based per-
formance measures is inversely related to noisiness in accounting data. Llewellen et al. 
(1987) provided additional empirical support for this finding. Yermack (1995), how-
ever, did not find a significant relationship between stock option grants and noise in 
accounting earnings as measured by variance in the change in return on equity (ROE) 
as a percent of variance in annual stock returns. 
Tax reduction incentives and the impact of being in a regulated industry are ad-
ditional rationales for stock option compensation. Yermak (1995) found no support for 
an association between stock option grants and net operating loss (NOL) status, but did 
find a negative association between regulated industry status and incidence of stock 
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options. The finding regarding industry regulation is driven by utilities and insurance 
companies and does not obtain for banks.  
Earnings management incentives, or a high cost of reporting low earnings, 
could be a rationale for stock option grants. Matsunaga (1995) provided evidence of 
earnings management using stock options. Proportional interest costs serve as a proxy 
for the cost of reporting low earnings. This study shows a positive association between 
stock option awards and greater cost associated with reporting low accounting earnings 
(i.e., greater incentives for earnings management). Yermack (1995), however, found no 
such relationship.  
The Impact of Stock Option Compensation on Firm Value 
While the motivation for stock option compensation may be mixed, ultimately 
its objective is improvement in firm value, notwithstanding the rent extraction hy-
pothesis.13 The debate continues on this point as well.  
Tehranian and Wagelin (1985) found that stock price increased 11 percent on 
the announcement of a firm’s implementation of an executive compensation plan that 
linked pay to accounting returns. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Loderer and Martin 
(1997), did not find significant association between stock ownership and firm perform-
ance, however. Similarly, the evidence regarding the impact of stock options is mixed. 
Yermack (1997)and Aboody and Kaznik (2000) found that stock option grants were 
____________ 
13 The rent extraction hypothesis posits that managers are able to set their own awards, and do so opportunistically, 
and potentially in conflict with shareholder value maximization. Studies that provide support for the rent extrac-
tion hypothesis include Yermack, (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik, (2000). Hanlon, et. al. (2004) however, do not 
find support for rent extraction in their study. 
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associated with increased firm value. Aboody (1996) found an inverse relation between 
stock option holdings by CEOs and firm value. 
Studies that examine the value relevance of Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS) 123 disclosures include Rees and Stott (1998) and Aboody, et. al. 
(2004). Rees and Stott found that the SFAS 123 expense was valued in an opposite di-
rection from other firm expenses, implying a positive investor expectation of future net 
benefits from stock option grants. Aboody, et. al. included in their model a factor to 
capture the future benefits of the grant. They found that the SFAS 123 expense is nega-
tively associated with firm value, as would be any operating expense when the future 
benefits arising from the expense are captured separately in the model. 
Core and Guay (2002) found evidence that stock options were granted in such a 
manner as to establish or maintain an optimal level of pay-to-performance incentives, 
as determined by established criteria for option grant awards based on extant theory of 
stock option compensation. The present study is concerned with idiosyncratic knowl-
edge regarding the conditions under which stock option grants are associated with in-
creased firm value. That Core and Guay have identified an essential equilibrium in this 
system does not obviate the need for idiosyncratic knowledge of the conditions for in-
dividual grant effectiveness. 
Measurement of Stock Option Compensation 
Methods for measuring stock option compensation have evolved substantially 
as the significance of this component of executive compensation has increased. Early 
research adopted indicator variables to separate firms with executive stock options 
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from those whose executives did not hold stock options(DeFusco et al. 1990; Gaver 
and Gaver 1993a; Smith and Watts 1992). Subsequent researchers refined this proxy 
for the value of stock options, using the number of stock options (Tufano 1996) and the 
number of options multiplied by the stock price (Baker and Hall 1998). 
A major complication in examining the impact of stock options is operationaliz-
ing their value. LLV (1991) emphasized the difference in stock option valuation be-
tween stockholders and CEOs. Early research on stock options focused on the 
valuation of options from the perspective of stockholders. This was predominantly the 
result of the substantial controversy surrounding SFAS 123. Issued in 1995, SFAS 123 
established a fair-value based valuation for stock options with the exception of those 
awarded to employees. For employee stock options, firms could continue the widely 
accepted practice of following Accounting Principles Board opinion #25 (APB-25) but 
were still required to provide a pro-forma disclosure of net income as if the fair value 
method were used.  
The foundation work in measurement and valuation of stock options is the 
seminal work of Black and Scholes (1973). Noreen and Wolfson (1981) analyzed the 
applicability of the Black-Scholes option pricing model to the valuation of executive 
stock options. They noted the similarity between executive stock options and publicly 
traded warrants and provided evidence that the application of the Black-Scholes model 
to employee stock options is not inappropriate. Furthermore, they compared the Cox-
Ross model to the Black-Scholes and found no difference between the two in the rela-
 26 
tive errors generated by application of the models to traded warrants with terms similar 
to executive stock options.  
The Black-Scholes pricing model is widely used as an analytical tool for capital 
market participants to price and hedge options (Hull 2000). Furthermore, accounting 
researchers have applied the Black-Scholes model to the valuation of stock options for 
research purposes. Significant attention was paid to adjustments to the Black-Scholes 
model to accommodate the differences between stock options granted to executives and 
those that are publicly traded by capital market participants. The primary differences 
are term to maturity, liquidity, and the dilutive nature of employee stock options versus 
traded stock options (Huddart 1994). Much of this work was done at the time that the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) was deliberating Statement 123, and 
was focused on improving financial statement presentation by modifying the Black-
Scholes model to reflect the major differences between traded stock options and execu-
tive compensation stock options.14  
Antle and Smith (1985) described an inventory-type methodology for measur-
ing the value of stock options that uses a form of the Black-Scholes model. Application 
of the Black-Scholes option-pricing model was facilitated by the subsequent introduc-
tion of mandatory stock option data in the annual financial reports of publicly-traded 
companies. Researchers used the model to measure the value of current year option  
____________ 
14 Significant papers include Foster, Koogler  and Vickery (1991), Huddart (1994), Hemmer, Matsunaga  and Shev-
lin (1994), and Carpenter (2002). 
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grants (Mehran 1995) and the value of the executive’s option portfolio (Agrawal and 
Mandeleker 1987).  
The value of an option to a CEO is different from the valuation by a share-
holder, however (LLV, 1991). The Black-Scholes value of an option grant is deter-
mined at the date of the grant for financial statement purposes. A better measure of the 
continuing incentives in an option grant is the manner in which the intrinsic value of 
the option changes based on executive actions. The impact of agent actions on equity-
based compensation is termed pay-performance sensitivity. Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
defined pay-performance sensitivity as the dollar change in CEO wealth per dollar 
change in shareholder wealth. The measure of a manager’s incentives to select actions 
that affect the parameters of the distribution of an outcome, however, are best de-
scribed by the derivative of the manager’s expected utility with respect to changes in 
those parameters (Lambert et al. 1991). The incentive imbedded in an option grant for a 
CEO to increase stock price would then be expressed as the delta of the option grant, or 
the derivative of the option grant value with respect to stock price (Hall 1998), and the 
incentive to increase risk as the vega, or derivative of the option grant value with re-
spect to the variance in stock returns (Guay 1999; Lambert et al. 1991). This study em-
ploys vega, the sensitivity of option value to stock return volatility, as the measure of 
CEO incentives. These incentives are computed following the one-year approximation 
method developed by Core and Guay (2002). 
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The Role of Stock Options in CEO Compensation 
CEO compensation can be broadly categorized as either sensitive or insensitive 
to firm performance (Kole 1997). The primary component of insensitive compensation 
is salary, although insurance benefits, vacation pay, and other perquisites are other ex-
amples of insensitive forms of compensation as well. In a compensation scheme, salary 
performs the role of insuring that CEO pay meets a reservation wage and insulating the 
CEO from some amount of compensation risk.15 A compensation contract that consists 
wholly of salary is suboptimal in the absence of completely observable performance, 
however, since it fails to check inherent moral hazard. The normative prescription for 
moral hazard, founded in agency theory, is a pay scheme that imposes risk-sharing via 
performance-sensitive compensation. 
Cash bonus compensation is sensitive to firm performance in that these pay-
ments are generally made on the basis of achievement of performance targets, both fi-
nancial and non-financial. The significance of bonus payments in a compensation 
scheme will be contingent on the relative noisiness of accounting signals versus market 
(price) signals, as well as the relative informativeness of the accounting signal versus a 
market signal regarding CEO actions (Lambert and Larcker 1987). Emphasis on bonus  
____________ 
15 Of course, threat of termination is a compensation risk that even salary cannot insure against. In this sense, all 
compensation is sensitive to firm performance. 
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payments in a compensation scheme is increased when accounting signals are a) less 
noisy and b) more sensitive to managerial action. While bonus-based compensation 
addresses moral hazard on the part of the CEO, it provides the CEO with earnings 
management incentives (Healy 1985).  
Equity-based compensation is a widely accepted form of performance-sensitive 
compensation. It is weighted more heavily in a compensation contract when accounting 
signals are noisy (Lambert and Larcker 1987), and when a high level of investment op-
portunity requires incentives for managers to focus attention on developing these op-
portunities (Kole 1997; Myers 1977; Smith and Watts 1992). Equity-based pay 
achieves alignment of shareholder and CEO interests in terms of investment horizon 
(DeChow and Sloan 1991), and effects a risk-sharing between the CEO and sharehold-
ers that reduces moral hazard. Stock shares and stock options are not equivalent com-
pensation instruments, however, because they expose the CEO to different risks.. 
In the standard agency problem, the principal (shareholder) is assumed to be 
risk neutral while the agent (CEO) is risk averse; the shareholder can diversify holdings 
while the CEO cannot. The CEO of a firm has a significant stake in the outcome of the 
firm’s investments, even absent stock ownership, due to risk of a diminished manage-
rial reputation or possible termination. Investments undertaken by the firm expose the 
CEO to human capital risk, the risk that the CEO’s value in the labor market will fluc-
tuate depending on the outcome of investment decisions. There is an incentive, there-
fore, for a risk-averse CEO to be more conservative in a firm’s investment policy than 
would be preferred by the diversified, risk-neutral owners of the firm. Adding stock 
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ownership to compensation further reduces the diversification of the CEO with respect 
to the financial performance of firm investments, and compounds the CEO’s risk-
aversion in anticipated investment decisions. Thus, this solution to the moral hazard 
problem of agency, namely risk-sharing via agent ownership, does not solve, and may 
in fact exacerbate, the divergence of risk preferences between shareholders and the 
CEO. A CEO may not select the highest possible NPV project from the set available in 
order to reduce the outcome variance of the project and lower personal risk. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) posit stock options as a solution to this divergence 
in risk preference between the CEO and the owners of the firm. When the owner 
wishes to induce risk-taking by the agent, the optimal pay structure takes the form of a 
call option, where downside risk is limited and upside potential is high (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992, p. 431).16 
The Impact of Option Grants on Firm Value 
Stock option compensation is designed to motivate executive effort in the 
search for, and development of value-increasing investment opportunities.17 This 
mechanism is driven by two primary derivatives of option grant value, namely, sensi-
tivity to stock price and sensitivity to return volatility. Higher sensitivity of compensa-
tion to stock price should induce increased executive effort in the search for positive 
NPV projects that increase stock price. Higher sensitivity to equity risk is also hy-
____________ 
16 Milgrom and Roberts (1992) also point out the requirement for some form of capital rationing in this situation to 
prevent excessive risk-taking. 
17 This is a different role for executive effort than posed by the standard agency problem in that this effort is multi-
dimensional (both search and development effort are required), and increased effort does not necessarily shift the 
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pothesized to generate effort in search of positive NPV projects, but also generates ad-
ditional incentive to pursue projects that have higher variance in project returns. In-
creased variance in project returns is appealing to executives compensated with 
options, since the value of stock options increases in return variance.18 Increased effort 
in the search for and development of high return-variance projects will generate more 
investment opportunities with increased levels of risk (defined as variance in returns) 
than would be available in the absence of such an incentive. Ceteris paribus, increasing 
sensitivity to price alone would provide an incentive to increase the value of the firm 
by developing positive NPV projects. However, increased sensitivity to equity risk is 
expected to result in an even larger set of investment opportunities, given the increased 
level of risk in investment opportunities that would be acceptable to the CEO. 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between stock options and 
firm risk. DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990) found a positive association between the 
adoption of an executive stock option plan and increased stock return variance. Guay 
(1999) documents a positive association between the sensitivity of compensation to 
equity risk and the annualized standard deviation of stock returns. These results indi-
cate that stock option compensation is consistent with increased managerial risk-taking. 
This study tests for the effectiveness of option grants in increasing firm value, a 
result of expansion in the investment opportunity set of the firm. Effectiveness is 
measured by investor expectations that form and are embedded in stock price. Ceteris 
                                                                                                                                              
outcome distribution to the right in terms of first-order stochastic dominance. Lambert (1986) provides an analysis 
of the agency problem in risky project selection.  
18 Increased variance results in an increased range of potential gains from the option, while losses on options are 
bounded below at zero. 
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paribus, firms that offer option grants should exhibit a greater value in the year after 
granting the options relative to their value subsequent to non-grant years. Thus, the fol-
lowing hypothesis is tested: 
H1: Option grants to CEOs are associated with an increase in market 
value. 
Hypothesis 1 is based on the assumption that CEOs influence the size and com-
position of a firm’s investment opportunity set. There exists the potential for simultane-
ity in considering the causal relationship between option grants and the investment 
opportunity set. Previous research indicates that compensation boards base option 
grants on contemporaneous knowledge of the firm’s investment opportunity set IOS, 
with the expectation that option grants will motivate CEOs to develop existing growth 
opportunities (Gaver and Gaver 1993a; Janakiraman 1998; Smith and Watts 1992). 
However, the compensation board is not likely to have complete information on the set 
of real options available to a CEO, but may wish to motivate the executive to take more 
risks in seeking and developing these investments. This means that the investment op-
portunity set is not only a basis for an option grant, but may be the result of a grant as 
well. The current study considers temporal precedence between the option grant and 
subsequent measurement of return as a control for this simultaneity.  
The Influence of Option Grant Sensitivity on Firm Value 
From a purely incentive perspective, a compensation committee, acting in the 
shareholders’ best interests, may grant stock options for one of two reasons: (i) to off-
set decreases in risk-taking incentives from a desired level, arising from a change in the 
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CEO’s compensation package (e.g., when CEO exercises some existing stock options), 
or (ii) to increase risk-taking incentives from existing levels. Core and Guay (1999) 
found evidence to support the hypothesis that on average, options are granted with 
characteristics to offset deviations from an optimal level of exposure to stock price. 
Such a deviation would result when a CEO exercises existing stock options and/or sells 
shares of stock. Ofek and Yermack (2000) found that CEOs sell stock as part of a self-
managed hedging program to reduce the level of unsystematic risk to which they are 
exposed. Taken together, the findings of Core and Guay (1999) and Ofek and Yermack 
(2000) support the existence of a stable level of incentive. If stock options are granted 
in order to maintain an optimal level of incentive, the existence of an equilibrium be-
tween grants, investment risk and firm value would argue against option grants having 
a valuation impact.  
“Stable” firms are defined as those that maintain a relatively constant level of 
total stock-option related CEO incentives before and after a stock option grant. Thus, 
the following hypothesis is tested.  
H2: For firms appearing to maintain stable levels of sensitivity to stock 
price in the CEO’s portfolio, there is no significant association be-
tween firm value and the grant of stock options. 
However, as previously noted, not all firms are likely to maintain stable sensi-
tivities. Compensation committees may not be in a position to determine accurately the 
incentive impact of the CEO’s compensation structure and/or may not be in a position 
to assess the valuation of stock-based instruments from their CEO’s perspective. 
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Moreover, options are sometimes granted for reasons other than their attendant incen-
tive effects. 
For "trend" or disequilibrium firms, where sensitivity increases over time, the 
influence of option grants on risk-taking is predicated on the increased sensitivity to 
equity risk that options generate when they are added to a CEO’s portfolio. Therefore, 
it is expected that the risk-taking incentives vary directly with the sensitivity of the op-
tion grant to equity risk.  
Compensation boards can manipulate sensitivity incentives, thereby optimizing 
the impact of existing CEO portfolios (Core and Guay 1999). However, this manipula-
tion is implemented through current option grants. Hypothesis 3 investigates the rela-
tionship between the level of incentive generated by the option grant and subsequent 
firm value. 
H3: For firms not appearing to maintain stable sensitivity to stock price 
in the CEO’s portfolio (trend firms), subsequent returns vary di-
rectly with the sensitivity of a CEO’s option grant to equity risk. 
The first three hypotheses are interrelated and approach the relationship among 
option grants, sensitivity to equity risk, and the returns on stock price from multiple 
angles, while holding existing portfolio incentives constant. These tests of individual 
option grants distinguish this study from prior work which examined total portfolio 
equity risk incentives (Guay 1999). In addition, by segregating incentive restoration 
grants and incentive trending grants, this study isolates the conditions under which the 
effectiveness of option grants can be directly tested. It is important to note, however, 
that Hypothesis 3 does not address the impact of the interaction among the incentive 
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effects of new options granted and those of other components in the CEO’s compensa-
tion package.  
The Effects of Interaction Between Option Grant and Portfolio Sensitivity 
While the existing portfolio of a CEO is not under the direct control of the 
compensation board, the implications of this portfolio for the incentive effects of stock 
option grants are significant (Lambert et al. 1991). The incentive effectiveness of a cur-
rent option grant is affected by the characteristics of an executive’s existing portfolio of 
wealth. Hypotheses 4 and 5 address the characteristics of the CEO’s existing portfolio 
that are anticipated to influence the effectiveness of contemporaneous option grants, 
regardless of the status of the firm with respect to equilibrium of incentives.  
The argument by Milgrom and Roberts (1992) that stock option compensation 
triggers increased risk-taking in investments by risk-averse executives is appropriate 
when the option is analyzed on a stand-alone basis. LLV (1991), however, examined 
the implications for the incentives generated by an option when the executive’s com-
pensation consists of other, fixed wealth as well as contingent payments whose value is 
correlated with that of the option. LLV suggested that the interrelationship between the 
incentives in the option grant and the other two components of the compensation con-
tract, fixed wealth and correlated contingent compensation, alter the value of the option 
grant to the recipient. In theoretical analysis, LLV found that the value of the option 
compensation to the recipient increases weakly in the level of fixed wealth, and de-
creases weakly in the sensitivity of other contingent compensation to the performance 
parameter on which the value of the option is based. Thus, when evaluating the incen-
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tive impact of option compensation, the content of the entire compensation package 
must be considered. 
Correlated Wealth 
The value to the executive of current compensation differs from the value of the 
compensation to the firm. Market imperfections exist which can lower the value to the 
executive of a stock option below the value that is computed for financial statement 
purposes.19 The two primary market imperfections are the relative non-liquidity of em-
ployee stock options and the inability of executives to diversify the investment that 
employee stock options represent. CEOs may not sell their stock options, nor hedge 
them, generally speaking.20  
When evaluating the incentives of a stock option, therefore, it is important to 
consider the executive’s existing portfolio of wealth in addition to current stock option 
compensation, and how that portfolio value changes with stock price. The liquidity and 
diversification constraints affect the value of stock options to executives such that the 
value to an executive of a current stock option depends on how the balance of the ex-
ecutive’s portfolio changes with the stock price, which also drives the value of the op-
tion grant. As a result of this covariance, there is an inverse relationship between the 
value of the current option grant and the degree to which the value of the existing port-
folio varies with stock price (Lambert et al. 1991). Higher correlation between the 
____________ 
19 FAS123R (December 2004) specifies new reporting requirements for stock option compensation. Effective with 
annual reporting periods ending after July 2005, firms must recognize as compensation expense the fair value of 
stock options granted. 
20 Hemmer (1993) examines hedged option compensation, such that moral hazard is precluded and the contract is 
risk free to the executive. 
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value of existing wealth and the value of the current option grant results in a lower 
level of CEO wealth diversification. Thus, current compensation that is sensitive to 
stock price variance further reduces diversification in the executive’s portfolio of exist-
ing wealth that is sensitive to stock price variance, and induces risk-aversion. For ex-
ample, a CEO with $10 million in compensation, of which $5 million is sensitive to 
stock price, has a compensation portfolio sensitivity ratio of 0.50. An additional $2 
million in stock-price-sensitive compensation will change this ratio to 0.57. As a result, 
the CEOs exposure to stock price changes has increased since the proportion of pay 
that is sensitive to stock price has increased. This finding implies that the incentives 
imbedded in equity risk-sensitive option grants are attenuated and perhaps offset by the 
risk-aversion that is generated through reduced diversification of equity risk-sensitive 
existing holdings. If, on the whole, a grant is expected to result in a reduction in firm 
value, an efficient compensation committee would not be expected to award the grant. 
However, if the portfolio considerations attenuate, but do not entirely offset the incen-
tives in the grant, the compensation committee may still award the grant for incentive 
purposes. Thus, in a manner consistent with the LLV prediction, the following hy-
pothesis is considered: 
H4: Higher equity risk sensitivity of a CEO’s existing portfolio attenu-
ates the relationship between the sensitivity of the current option 
grant and subsequent returns. 
Unrelated Wealth 
Managerial risk aversion is decreasing in managerial wealth. LLV analytically 
demonstrated that, for a manager with a utility function exhibiting non-increasing abso-
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lute risk-aversion, even when existing wealth has a stochastic component, the value of 
an uncertain payoff is increasing in unrelated wealth. For example, for an individual 
who takes more risk when wealthier (decreasing absolute risk-aversion), the value of a 
lottery increases with existing wealth. In the context of executive compensation, a high 
level of existing executive wealth that is not contingent on the CEO firm’s stock price 
or volatility is therefore expected to supplement the motivation for risk-taking imbed-
ded in the current option grant. The following hypothesis is proposed: 
H5: A higher level of unrelated wealth in a CEOs existing portfolio 
strengthens the relationship between the sensitivity of the current 
option grant and subsequent returns.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND RESEARCH SAMPLE  
Data 
The source of data for this study is Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database. 
Stock option compensation data was collected on all Firm/CEO combinations con-
tained in the Execucomp database for the years 1992-2002 where firms granted stock 
options to the CEO at least once. The Execucomp database contains compensation data 
from proxy statements for the S&P 500, the S&P mid-cap 400, and the S&P small-cap 
600 firms. Execucomp provides data on the compensation of each firm’s top five ex-
ecutive officers; however, this study focuses on CEO compensation only. The data in 
the Execucomp database is obtained from Compustat, and an audit of Execucomp 
found a one-to-one match with the Compustat database in the audit sample for the vari-
ables used in this study. Stock return variance data was collected from Execucomp 
also. This study uses the Black-Scholes volatility statistic, which is the Execucomp-
computed standard deviation volatility, calculated over 60 months. This volatility cal-
culation is used to compute Black-Scholes values for option grants in Execucomp. This 
study also uses the Black-Scholes dividend yield contained in the Execucomp database 
as the dividend yield for calculating grant and portfolio sensitivities.  
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Sample Selection 
The sample used in this study consists of all firms in the Execucomp database 
granting stock options to CEOs at least once during the years 1992-2002. This sample 
consists of 2,349 firms, which represents almost 90% of the firms whose data are re-
ported in Execucomp over the eleven year period. Table 1 provides descriptive statis-
tics pertaining to industry for the firms that comprise this sample. For tests of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, which investigate the impact of option grants on subsequent firm 
value, this sample provides 14,428 firm years of data out of a possible 18,792 observa-
tions. The sample size is diminished by missing data. Table 2 describes sample selec-
tion steps that generated the data used in tests of Hypotheses 1 & 2. Outlier 
observations are identified based on the variables constructed for and used in the re-
gression analyses. Outlier treatment is not applied to raw data, but is applied to vari-
ables before they are included in the regression models. Table 2 reconciles the total 
potential firm years with the number of firm years used in the regression analyses.
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms 
No.
Two-Digit 
SIC Code Industry Freq. Percent
Cum. 
Freq. 
Cum. 
Percent 
1 10 – 14 Mining, Oil and Gas Extraction 96 4 96 4 
2 15 – 17 Construction 25 1 121 5 
3 20 – 21 Food and Kindred Products, Tobacco 56 2 177 7 
4 22 – 23 Textiles and Apparel Manufacturing 34 1 211 8 
 5 24 – 26 Lumber, Furniture, Paper and Allied Prod-
ucts 
57 3 268 11 
6 27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 36 2 304 13 
 Table 1 continued 
41 
No.
Two-Digit 
SIC Code Industry Freq. Percent
Cum. 
Freq. 
Cum. 
Percent 
7 28 Chemicals and Allied Products 145 6 449 19 
8 29 Petroleum Refining and Related Ind. 23 1 472 20 
9 30 – 34 Rubber, Plastic, Primary Metal Ind. 115 5 587 25 
10 35 – 36 Ind. and Comm. Machinery, Computer 
Equipment, Electronic and Electrical 
Equipment and Components 
317 13 904 38 
11 37 – 39 Transportation Equipment, Medical 
Equipment, Controls, and Misc. Manufac-
turing 
190 8 1094 47 
12 40 – 47 Transportation 64 2 1158 49 
13 48 Communications 71 3 1229 52 
14 49 Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 127 6 1356 58 
15 50 – 59 Retail 252 11 1608 69 
15 60 – 62 Financial Services 215 9 1823 78 
16 63 – 69 Insurance and Real Estate 146 6 1969 84 
17 70 – 89 Services 366 15 2335 99 
18  Other 14 1 2349 100 
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Table 2 
Sample Selection Hypotheses 1 & 2 
Screen Procedure  
 
  
Firms Granting Options 1992-2002 2,349  
   
Firm Years in 1994-2001 18,792  
Less Firm Year outliers deleted 881  
Less Firm Years with missing data 3.483 * 
   
Total  Sample for Hypotheses  1& 2 14,428  
  
* Firms leaving the database before 2001 or entering after 1992 resulted in the majority of these 
observations. 
 
 
Table 3 provides a distribution of the firm-year observations by year. The firm 
year observations are evenly distributed over the timeframe of the analysis, with each 
year containing between 10% and 12% of the total firm-year observations. There are 
two significant factors to note in Table 4. The first is the monotonic increase in the per-
cent of firm-years with option grants in the prior year. This is consistent with the in-
creased use of stock options as a compensation instrument over this timeframe. In 
1994, 34.5% of firms’ CEOs had received option grants in the prior year. By 2002, this 
percentage had risen to 78.7%. The second significant observation is the sharp decline 
in the number of firm-years in the sample from 1998 to 1999 and again from 1999 to 
2000. The net change from 1998 to 1999 is comprised of 157 firms dropping out of the 
sample and 37 new firms entering the sample. The net change from 1999 to 2000 is 
comprised of 103 new firms in the sample and an attrition of 198 firms. During these 
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periods there was substantial turnover of firms in the sample. Firms would drop out of 
the sample if they failed or were acquired by another firm.  
The test of Hypothesis 2 uses available grant and portfolio sensitivity data to 
identify firms that demonstrate an increasing sensitivity to equity risk. All others are 
considered to be incentive equilibrium firms, even if such categorization obtains by 
default as a result of missing data.  
Table 3 
Distribution of Grants by Year 
Year 
Percent of 
Firm-Years 
With Option 
Grants 
In the Prior 
Year 
Number of 
Firm-Years 
Percent of 
Total 
Firm-Years 
 Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 
1994 34.5% 1616 11.2% 1616 11.2% 
1995 38.4% 1693 11.7% 3309 22.9% 
1996 40.5% 1727 12.0% 5036 34.9% 
1997 46.4% 1717 11.9% 6753 46.8% 
1998 53.2% 1699 11.8% 8452 58.6% 
1999 61.1% 1579 10.9% 10031 69.5% 
2000 65.9% 1484 10.3% 11515 79.8% 
2001 72.2% 1461 10.1% 12976 89.9% 
2002 78.7% 1452 10.1% 14428 100.0% 
 
Total  14428 100.0%   
Mean 53.7% 1603    
 
 
The sample used in this study for tests of Hypotheses 3-5 also consists of 
Execucomp firms that granted options during the 1992-2002 timeframe. This sample 
contains 6,158 firm-years for grants from 1993 through 2001. The reduction in sample 
size from that used in tests of Hypotheses 1 & 2 is largely due to data limitations for 
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calculation of sensitivity to equity risk. Also, firm-years without grants in the prior year 
are excluded from this sample. Table 4 describes sample selection steps that generated 
the data used in tests of Hypotheses 3 through 5. As in tests of Hypotheses 1 & 2, out-
lier identification and treatment is based on the variables constructed for and used in 
regression analyses.  
Table 4 
Sample Selection Hypotheses 3, 4 & 5 
Screen Procedure    
 
Firms Granting Options 1992-2002 2,349 
  
Firm Years in 1994-2001 18,792 
Less Firm Years with missing financial data 5,412 
Less Firm Years without prior year grants 6,606 
Less Outlier observations discarded 616 
  
Total Sample for Hypotheses 3-5 6,158 
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CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY 
Model 
The Ohlson (1991) framework explicates the relationship between accounting 
identities and market value and is used to model the relationship between firm value 
and the characteristics of option grants. In the context of the Ohlson model, the asso-
ciation among option grants, portfolio characteristics, and firm value is measured by 
the information value of the grant and portfolio characteristics. The Ohlson model is 
valuable here because it considers book values and earnings as components of firm 
value. Following Ohlson, Amir (1993) provides the model that is applied in this re-
search. The Amir specification is as follows: 
 
Pt = α0 BVt–1 + α1 NIt + α2 BVt + βVt + ηt, 
 
where P is the market value per share of common stock; BV is the book value of eq-
uity, on a per-share basis; NI is the firm’s earnings per share over period (t–1,t); and V 
is a vector of information variables, other than book value and net income, that may be 
value-relevant in pricing the firm. 
Application of the Ohlson model requires the researcher to address scale effects 
in research design. Scale effect is the result of overwhelming influence by the largest 
firms in a sample for statistical analysis involving a cross-section of firms. Amir ad-
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justs for potential heteroskedasticity by deflating all variables in the model by the prior 
period book value of equity.  
Substantial debate surrounds the issue of controlling for scale effects. Kothari 
and Zimmerman (1995) support price models as yielding less biased coefficient esti-
mates, although they leave the specification subject to more serious heteroskedasticity 
and other econometric problems. They suggest enriching studies by testing them for 
sensitivity to functional form. This study adopts a returns model for the main tests. 
Chapter VII presents an analysis of the sensitivity of these research results to the alter-
nate model specification using price as the dependent variable in a levels model.  
This study employs the Amir specification of the Ohlson model, with the ex-
ception of scaling independent variables by sales. The model used in this study is as 
follows: 
 
Pt /Pt–1 = α0 + α1 BVt/Salest + α2 NIt/Salest + βVt/Salest + ηt,  
 
where Pt is the market value per share of common stock at time (t); Pt /Pt–1 is a variable 
that represents the return on the firm’s stock over the period  (t–1, t);  BVt is the book 
value of equity per share, at time (t); NIt is the firm’s earnings per share over period (t–
1,t); sales is the net sales per share for the firm in year (t); and V is a vector of informa-
tion variables at time (t). In this study, V varies depending on the hypothesis being 
tested. Appendix A defines the variables that comprise V. Tables of results provide de-
tailed specifications of the models employed, including the variables that comprise V 
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in the pertinent test. Consistent with the Amir model, this study deflates continuous 
information variables to per-share values.  
The Ohlson model employs both current and lagged book value of equity. For 
empirical tests, however, the high correlation between current and lagged book value of 
equity subjects the empirical results to severe multicollinearity. Variance inflation fac-
tors, when current and lagged book values are present in the model, exceed 11, which 
causes inferences about the related variable coefficients to be unreliable. The model 
used in this study excludes the prior (lagged) book value of equity. The absence of this 
variable inflates the significance of the intercept in this model but results in more reli-
able coefficient estimates. 
Variable Construction 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used in tests of Hypotheses 1 through 5 is the raw re-
turn on the stock from the beginning of the year of disclosure of stock option grant in-
formation in the firm’s 10k to the end of that fiscal year. Hypotheses 3 through 5 are 
based on information whose disclosure is limited to the firm’s 10k. Thus, interim dis-
closures, while they may be of value in determining the existence of a grant, are insuf-
ficient to enable assessment of the sensitivity of the grant or the extant CEO portfolio 
to equity risk. 
The impact of the dichotomous independent variable, grant or no grant, is more 
clearly identified and tested using a change in market value, a returns metric, as op-
posed to using the level of market value. Sensitivity analysis demonstrates a similar 
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result, however, when the dependent variable is measured as the level of market value 
per share. The results for a levels model, as well as the results of sensitivity tests of us-
ing size-adjusted returns are presented in Chapter VII. 
Independent Variables—Ohlson Framework 
The earnings variable (NI) is the net income for the current year on a per share 
basis. Book value (BV) is the current year-end book value per share. Prior period BV, 
present in the Ohlson model, is not included in the model specification for this re-
search. As previously discussed, a high correlation between prior and current BV gen-
erates a significant problem with multicollinearity, when both variables are present in 
the model. 
Independent Variables—Information Variables 
Sensitivity of an option grant to equity risk is calculated using the one year ap-
proximation method following Core and Guay (2002). The partial derivative of a grant 
option’s Black-Scholes value at the time of the grant, with respect to a 1% change in 
the standard deviation of stock returns is computed and multiplied by the number of 
options in the grant to generate the sensitivity variable. The sensitivity of a CEO’s port-
folio to equity risk is the aggregation of the sensitivities to equity risk of all of the stock 
and option holdings in the portfolio at the beginning of the year. The Core and Guay 
(2002) methodology is used for estimating portfolio incentives from stock and option 
sensitivities. Appendix C details the methodology used in this study for the calculation 
of all stock and option-related sensitivities.
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Unrelated executive wealth in the immediately prior period (URW) is imple-
mented using as a proxy the prior year salary to the CEO. A higher level of cash in 
compensation allows a CEO more opportunity to diversify holdings. LLV demon-
strated that the value of a compensation contract is increasing in the fixed, i.e., non-
Exhibit 1: Timeline of Option Grants, Disclosure, and Measurement of Return 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Grant Awarded Grant Data Disclosed in 10K
Return Measured
Time Frame for Equilibrium Computation
FYE (2)FYE* (0) FYE (3)FYE (1)
Hypotheses 1 & 2
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Grant Awarded Grant Data Disclosed in 10K
Return Measured
Time Frame for Equilibrium Computation
*FYE = Fiscal Year End
FYE (3)FYE (2)FYE (1)FYE* (0)
Hypotheses 3, 4, & 5
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correlated, component of wealth. This relationship arises as a result of  risk-aversion 
being a decreasing function of the fixed (non-correlated) component. A CEO’s salary is 
the component of compensation that is least correlated with firm performance, as com-
pared with bonuses, stock holdings or grants, and stock option holdings and grants. As 
a result, salary is the most appropriate proxy for unrelated wealth. 
Adopting a proxy for unrelated wealth to use in this context is problematic be-
cause CEO wealth is not generally available, and attempts to estimate it require a sub-
stantial amount of estimation of very idiosyncratic parameters such as spending versus 
savings patterns and personal investment preferences. Thus, this study does not attempt 
to extrapolate CEO wealth from past years salaries, age and tenure, but, instead relies 
on prior year salary as a proxy for CEO non-correlated wealth.21 Models of CEO 
wealth that could be empirically validated would enhance research in this area signifi-
cantly. 
Incentive stability conditions are evaluated based on three-year trends in the 
CEO’s portfolio sensitivity to stock price. Exhibit I provides a timeline of the period 
over which grants are awarded, grant data is disclosed in the 10K, returns are meas-
ured, and the timeframe over which equilibrium status is measured.  Firms whose 
CEO’s portfolio sensitivity to stock price increases more than 5% annually, or at least 
10% overall are categorized as Case 1, constantly increasing sensitivity. Firms whose 
CEO’s portfolio sensitivity to stock price declines by at least 5% per year, or at least  
____________ 
21 The acknowledged limitation of this proxy for non-correlated wealth is a limitation of this study. If this proxy is 
inappropriate, in that it does not capture the level of non-correlated wealth, this study will be biased against find-
ing a significant interaction between this variable and option grant sensitivity. 
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10% overall, are categorized as Case 2, consistently decreasing sensitivity. Firms that 
demonstrate an increase (decrease) of at least 5% followed by a decrease (increase) of 
at least 5%, but do not change in excess of 5% overall, are categorized as Case 3, stable 
sensitivity. Firms demonstrating a stable sensitivity to stock price in executive stock 
and option portfolios, and all other firms that did not meet the criterion for Case 1, are 
categorized as stable firms.  
In tests of Hypotheses 3-5, where all firm-year observations have grants to the 
CEO in the prior year, the measurement of equilibrium is computed based on portfolio 
sensitivity to equity risk beginning in the year before the grant and ending in the year 
following the grant.22 Of the 6158 firm-years in this study for which case criteria are 
available, 2,559 observations (41.5%) are disequilibrium Case 1 firm years that dem-
onstrate consistently increasing CEO portfolio sensitivity. Another 399 (6.5%) are dis-
equilibrium Case 2 firm years that demonstrate consistently decreasing sensitivity, and 
3200 firm years (52.0%) are categorized as stable incentive equilibrium firm years.  
In tests of Hypotheses 1 & 2, where it is not a constant that all firm-year obser-
vations have grants to the CEO in the prior year, the measurement of equilibrium is 
computed based on portfolio sensitivity to equity risk beginning in the year immedi-
ately following the grant and ending in the year following the grant disclosure, two 
years after the grant.23 This deferred assessment period is necessary due to the high 
correlation between not granting options in the prior year and not being classified as a  
____________ 
22 Refer to Exhibit I for a schematic representation of the timeframes for computation of equilibrium status. 
23 Refer to Exhibit I for a schematic representation of the timeframes for computation of equilibrium status. 
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disequilibrium firm. A firm that does not grant options is effectively barred from dem-
onstrating an upward trend in CEO portfolio sensitivity. Thus, including the year of 
(no) grant in the computation biases the observation toward being an equilibrium firm. 
In order to detect differences between firms that are independent of the decision to 
grant options in the prior year, this study measures the equilibrium status using an in-
dependent time-frame. Using this time-frame, 36.2% of observations (5,235) are dis-
equilibrium Case 1 firm years that demonstrate consistently increasing CEO portfolio 
sensitivity. All other firm-years (63.8%) are classified as equilibrium firms. It should 
be noted that, using this methodology, equilibrium status may have obtained as a result 
of missing data. A bias toward equilibrium, however, would be expected to bias the 
results in this study against a significant finding on the relationship between disequilib-
rium status and returns.  
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in tests of Hy-
potheses 1 and 2 of this study. The return, BV/sales and NI/sales variables were deleted 
at 1% and 99% to control for the influence of extreme values.  
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in tests of Hy-
potheses 3 through 5 of this study. Outlier observations for the return, BV/sales, 
NI/sales, unrelated wealth, POGSTER (prior option grant sensitivity to equity risk) and 
POPSTER (prior option portfolio sensitivity to equity risk) variables were deleted at 
1% and 99% to control for the influence of extreme values. 
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Table 5 
Sample Descriptive Statistics (1994-2001). 
Hypotheses 1 & 2 
 N = 14,428 
Characteristic  Percentile Value Mean 
   
Market Value   75 3184.9  
 Median 50 985.1 5213.6 
  25 374.8  
     
Book Value   75 1270.4  
 Median 50 415.5 1607.0 
  25 170.7  
     
Net Income   75 148.0  
 Median 50 42.7 208.1 
  25 10.6  
     
Sales  75 2866.4  
 Median 50 924.4 3742.7 
  25 351.8  
     
Prior Year Option Grant  75 1.0  
 1 = Prior Year Option Grant Median 50 1.0 .537 
 0 = No Prior Year Option Grant  25 0.0  
     
Incentive Disequilibrium   75 1.0  
 1 = Incentive Disequilibrium Median 50 0.0 .363 
 0 = Incentive Stable  25 0.0  
     
 
 54 
Table 6 
Sample Descriptive Statistics. 
Hypotheses 3, 4 & 5  
N = 6,158 
Firm Characteristic  Percentile Value Mean 
   
Market Value   75 4306.91  
 Median 50 1295.07 6400.42 
  25 502.66  
     
Book Value   75 1601.34  
 Median 50 529.39 1884.67 
  25 223.94  
     
Net Income   75 194.98  
 Median 50 56.14 263.84 
  25 16.95  
     
Sales  75 3612.93  
 Median 50 1209.58 4332.30 
  25 471.64  
     
Prior Year  Vega–  75 205.68  
     CEO option grants Median 50 77.55 204.25 
  25 30.15  
     
Prior Year Vega-Portfolio  75 303.65  
     CEO portfolio holdings Median 50 124.51 294.58 
  25 50.88  
     
Prior Year Salary   75 656.65  
 Median 50 467.50 518.55 
  25 328.27  
     
Vega:  Sensitivity of an option to equity risk; the partial derivative of an option value, computed 
using the Black-Scholes model, with respect to stock return variance 
 
. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
Direct Effect Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the grant of CEO stock options is positively associ-
ated with the market value of the firm in the year following the grant. An ordinary 
least-squares multivariate regression model was used to examine the value relevance of 
prior-year option grants. 
Table 7 provides the statistical analysis of Hypothesis 1. The coefficient esti-
mates and related significance levels for two-tailed tests are presented for all variables. 
The null hypothesis, that the coefficient on an option grant is less than or equal to zero, 
cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance. While the hypothesized asso-
ciation between option grants and firm value is positive, the sign on the coefficient is 
negative but not statistically significant. This regression parameter (–0.012) is not dif-
ferent from zero with a p-value of 0.1186 (t–value –1.56) for the two-tailed t-test of the 
null hypothesis. Thus, this study found that the incremental return following the disclo-
sure of option grant information is not significantly different from zero. This study did 
not find that, overall, option grants are associated with positive future returns. 
Executive compensation theory and compensation plans in practice suggest that 
option grants are valuable to firms. This is predicated on investors’ placing value on 
the incentive impact of options, with the value of the incentives more than offsetting 
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the cost of the options granted24. Failure to find a positive association between option 
grants and subsequent firm value indicates that market participants may weight the 
contribution of the grant to executive incentives, and the probability of increased firm 
value due to increased executive effort in project selection and implementation, as hav-
ing insufficient value to offset the cost of the option, ceteris paribus.  
Table 7 
Regression Analysis: Hypothesis 1 
Dependent variable One Period Return   
     
Independent variables 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
estimate t value p-value 
Intercept    0.914  89.12  0.0001 
BV / Sales    –0.008  –1.22  0.2230 
NI / Sales    0.365  13.89  0.0001 
Prior Grant Indicator (POGIND)  H1: +  –0.012  –1.56  0.1186 
         
N = 14,428         
Adjusted R-squared  0.0659       
F Value  101.75       
Probability   0.0001             
         
Notes         
To control for outliers, all continuous variables are deleted at 1% and 99%. 
All t values are calculated on two-tail basis, even if hypothesis supports a one-tail test 
Coefficients on yearly indicator variables are suppressed 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Return =  One-period raw return:  fiscal year end (t) price per share / fiscal year end (t–1) price per 
share  
BV / Sales = Book value at year-end (t) / sales for year (t) 
NI / Sales = Net income in year/ sales in year (t) 
Prior Grant Indicator = 1 if firm grants CEO options in (t–1), else = 0 
 
____________ 
24 The cost of the option grant to shareholders includes the incremental compensation to the CEO for bearing addi-
tional risk as well as the dilutive effect of the additional shares. 
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Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicts an insignificant association between the value of the firm 
and stock option grants for firms that are stable with respect to CEO incentives. A mul-
tivariate regression model, estimated using ordinary least squares, was used to investi-
gate this hypothesis. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8. Across all 
firms in the sample, a prior-year option grant was not associated with increased firm 
value; however, Table 8 shows that for firms with a stable level of CEO stock-based 
incentives, the prior grant of stock options is negatively associated with subsequent re-
turns (t-statistic –8.62, p-value .0001). This is different from the relationship noted for 
the overall sample of stock option grants. The negative impact of stock option grants 
on firms with equilibrium in CEO incentives is offset by a positive association between 
stock option grant sensitivity and value for firms with disequilibrium in CEO incen-
tives. The coefficient on the interaction term between disequilibrium and prior grant is 
positive and significant (t-statistic 8.49, p-value 0.0001).  
The relationship between returns and prior period option grants for firms that 
demonstrate CEO incentive disequilibrium is positive. Table 8 presents results of an F-
test of the linear hypothesis that POGIND + POGINT= 0.25 The sum of the coefficients 
POGIND and POGINT represents the incremental contribution to return of disequilib-
rium firm year observations where options were granted in the prior year. The coeffi-
cient on the linear combination is positive (0.054) and significant at p = 0.0001. Thus,  
____________ 
25 POGIND = prior option grant indicator;  POGINT = prior option grant interaction with CEO portfolio incentive 
disequilibrium. 
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Table 8 
Regression Analysis: Hypothesis 2 
Dependent variable One Period Return  
     
Independent variables 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
estimate t value p-value 
Intercept  0.931 88.07 .0001 
BV / Sales  –0.003 –0.43 .6651 
NI / Sales  0.332 12.74 .0001 
Prior Grant Indicator (POGIND) H2: ns –0.083 –8.62 .0001 
Disequilibrium Indicator (DEQIND)  0.039 3.11 .0019 
Prior Grant * Disequilibrium 
(POGINT)  0.137 8.49 .0001 
     
N = 14,447     
Adjusted R-squared .0844    
F Value 110.69    
Probability 0.0001       
F-test: POGIND + POGINT = 0  0.054  .0001 
      
Notes      
To control for outliers, all continuous variables are deleted at 1% and 99%. 
All t values are calculated on two-tail basis, even if hypothesis supports one-tail test. 
 Coefficients on yearly indicator variables are suppressed. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Return =  One-period raw return:  fiscal year end (t) price per share / fiscal year end (t–1) price per 
share  
BV /  Sales = Book value at year-end (t) / sales for year (t) 
NI / Sales = Net income in year (t) / sales in year (t) 
POGIND: Indicator = 1 if firm grants CEO options in (t–1), else = 0 
DEQIND:  Indicator = 1 if firm is in incentive equilibrium for year-end  (t–2 to t+1), else = 0 
POGINT: POGIND *DEQIND 
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while overall, option grants are not associated with increased subsequent returns, dis-
equilibrium status in CEO portfolio incentives attenuates the negative relationship 
demonstrated by stable-incentive firms, and, in fact, generates a positive relationship 
between option grants and subsequent returns.  
Table 9 
Pearson Correlation Matrix  
Hypothesis Tests 1 & 2  
(p-value) 
N = 14,428 
 Return BV/Sales NI/Sales POGIND DEQIND 
Return 1.00 –0.0124 
(.1369) 
0.1190 
(.0001) 
–0.0286 
(.0006) 
0.1511 
(.0001) 
 
BV/Sales  1.00 0.0461 
(.0001) 
0.0042 
(.6108) 
–0.0431 
(.0001) 
 
NI/Sales   1.00 0.0262 
(.0016) 
0.0697 
(.0001) 
 
POGIND    1.00 0.1982 
(.0001) 
 
DEQIND     1.00 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Return = One-period raw return (fiscal year end (t) price per share / fiscal year end (t–1) price per share) 
BV/Sales = Book value at (t) divided by sales for time (t–1, t) 
NI/Sales = Net income per dollar of sales for time (t–1,t) 
POGIND: Indicator = 1 if firm grants CEO options in (t–1), else = 0 
DEQIND: Indicator = 1 if firm is NOT in incentive equilibrium for year-end (t–2 to t+1) 
 
 
Table 9 provides a Pearson correlation analysis for the variables used in the 
tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2. It is interesting to note the significant positive simple cor-
relation between the grant of options and the status of CEO incentive disequilibrium. 
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This is consistent with the findings of Core and Guay (1999), that options are granted 
to achieve optimal incentives, and may be expected to increase existing incentives. 
Interaction Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 states that for firms exhibiting incentive disequilibrium, the sensi-
tivity of an option grant to equity risk is positively associated with subsequent firm 
value. Tables 10  and 11 present the results of the multivariate analyses that test Hy-
pothesis 3. Overall, controlling for portfolio sensitivity and uncorrelated CEO wealth, 
the information variable representing prior option grant sensitivity to equity risk 
(POGSTER) is noted to be positively associated with firm value (Table 10: t-statistic 
2.03, p-value .0420). However, as indicated by the results in Table 11, the interaction 
between incentive disequilibrium status of the CEO portfolio and the grant’s sensitivity 
to equity risk is associated with a positive relationship between and firm value (t-
statistic 8.05, p-value .0001). The association between grant sensitivity and subsequent 
returns is insignificant for firms that do not demonstrate trending levels of CEO incen-
tives. Thus, this study supported Hypothesis 3, finding a positive, significant associa-
tion between option grant sensitivity and subsequent returns for firms where the CEO 
portfolio is trending upward over time. While overall the association between option 
grant sensitivity and firm value is positive and significant, this study provided evidence 
that increased grant sensitivity is of value only for the subset of firms where CEO port-
folio sensitivity has not established a stable level, but is increasing over time. 
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Table 10 
Regression Analysis: Grant Sensitivity 
 
Dependent Variable One Period Return     
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
sign 
 
Coefficient  
estimate t value p-value 
Intercept  0.878 63.74 .0001 
BV / Sales  0.009 0.73 .4662 
NI / Sales  0.345 8.19 .0001 
     
POGSTER ? 0.054 2.03 .0420 
     
Control Variables:     
POPSTER  –0.105 –5.95 .0001 
     
Uncorrelated Wealth  0.035 6.36 .0001 
     
     
N = 6158     
Adjusted R-squared 0.0797    
F Value 44.32    
Probability 0.0001       
      
Notes      
All continuous variable outliers are deleted at 1% and 99%. 
All t values are calculated on two-tail basis, even if hypothesis supports one-tail test. 
Coefficients on yearly indicator variables are suppressed. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Return =  One-period raw return:  fiscal year end (t) price per share / fiscal year end (t–1) price per 
share 
BV/Sales = Book value at year-end (t) / sales for year (t) 
NI/ Sales = Net income in year (t) / sales in year (t) 
POGSTER = Sensitivity to equity risk of CEO options granted in year (t–1)  
POPSTER =  Sensitivity to equity risk of CEO portfolio at year-end (t–1)  
Uncorrelated Wealth = CEO salary in year (t–1) scaled by sales in year (t) 
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Table 11 
Regression Analysis: Hypothesis 3 
Dependent Variable One Period Return 
  
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
estimate t value p-value 
Intercept  0.886 65.34 .0001 
BV / Sales  0.008 0.63 .5261 
NI / Sales  0.321 7.76 .0001 
POGSTER  –0.122 –4.22 .0001 
     
POGSTER*DEQIND H3: + 0.527 14.46 .0001 
     
Control Variables:     
     
POPSTER  –0.075 –4.30 .0001 
     
Uncorrelated Wealth  0.029 5.18 .0001 
     
     
N = 6158     
Adjusted R-squared .1099    
F Value 58.37    
Probability .0001       
     
Notes      
All continuous variable outliers are deleted at 1% and 99%. 
All t values are calculated on two-tail basis, even if hypothesis supports one-tail test. 
Coefficients on yearly indicator variables are suppressed. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Return =  One-period raw return:  fiscal year end (t) price per share / fiscal year end (t–1) price per 
share 
BV/Sales = Book value at year-end (t) / sales for year (t) 
NI/ Sales = Net Income in year (t) / sales in year (t) 
POGSTER = Sensitivity to equity risk of CEO options granted in year (t–1)  
POPSTER =  Sensitivity to equity risk of CEO portfolio at year-end (t–1)  
Uncorrelated Wealth = CEO salary in year (t–1) scaled by sales in year (t) 
DEQIND:  Indicator variable = 1 if firm exhibits disequilibrium in incentives (t–2,t+1), else = 0. 
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Hypothesis 4 
Table 12 provides results of analysis performed to test Hypothesis 4, namely, 
that there is a significant negative relationship between the interaction of grant and 
portfolio sensitivity and firm value. From Table 13 it can be noted that each of these 
independent variables is individually negatively correlated with returns. However, Hy-
pothesis 4 was not supported at conventional levels of significance (t-statistic 0.65, p-
value .5155). This indicates that overall portfolio sensitivity cannot be shown to inter-
act with grant sensitivity to influence firm value. This is surprising, in that the diversi-
fication argument is powerful, and used in many studies to support the notion that risky 
pay such as stock options is more costly for a firm.26  
Additional analysis is presented in Table 14, further decomposing the interac-
tion between portfolio and grant sensitivities and the impact of this interaction on re-
turns. While overall the impact of this interaction is not significant, as demonstrated in 
Table 12, for the subset of firms that demonstrate disequilibrium in CEO portfolio in-
centives, the interaction was shown to be negative and significant (t-statistic = –2.17, 
p-value .0300). This finding supports the LLV prediction that high levels of portfolio 
sensitivity to equity risk attenuate the positive impact of an option grant’s sensitivity, 
but this relationship is noted only for firms that demonstrate CEO incentive disequilib-
rium. 
____________ 
26 For example, Meulbroek (2001) uses the limits to diversification argument to measure the deadweight cost be-
tween cost of options to the firm and value of options to the executive. 
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Table 12 
Regression Analysis: Hypotheses 4 & 5 
Dependent Variable One Period Return   
    
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient  
estimate t value p-value 
Intercept  0.890 63.34 .0001 
BV / Sales  0.009 0.72 .4737 
NI / Sales  0.369 8.70 .0001 
     
POGSTER    –0.018 –0.53 .5985 
POGSTER * POPSTER H4: – 0.013 0.65 .5155 
POGSTER * Uncorrelated Wealth H5: + 0.038 3.71 .0002 
     
Control Variables:     
POPSTER  –0.116 –5.38 .0001 
     
Uncorrelated Wealth (URW)  0.024 3.55 .0004 
     
N = 6158     
Adjusted R-squared .0827    
F Value 39.56    
Probability 0.0001       
     
Notes      
All continuous variable outliers are deleted at 1% and 99%. 
All t values are calculated on two-tail basis, even if hypothesis supports one-tail test. 
 Coefficients on yearly indicator variables are suppressed. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Return =  One-period raw return:  fiscal year end (t) price per share / fiscal year end (t–1) price per 
share  
BV / Sales = Book value at year-end (t) / sales for year (t) 
NI / Sales = Net income in year (t) / sales in year (t) 
POGSTER = Sensitivity to equity risk of CEO options granted in year (t–1)  
POPSTER =  Sensitivity to equity risk of CEO stock and option portfolio at year-end (t–1)  
Uncorrelated Wealth = CEO salary in year (t–1) scaled by shares outstanding 
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Table 13 
Pearson Correlation Matrix   
Hypothesis Tests 3, 4, & 5 
(p-value) 
N = 6,158 
 
 Return 
Book 
Value/ 
Sales 
Net  
Income/ 
Sales 
Prior Grant 
Vega/ Sales 
Portfolio 
Vega/Sales 
Prior Sal-
ary /Sales 
Return  1.00 –0.0001 
(.9982) 
0.1084 
(.0001) 
–0.0278 
(.0294) 
–0.0665 
(.0001) 
0.0161 
(.2078) 
 
Book 
Value/Sales  
 1.00 0.0469 
(.0002) 
0.3257 
(.0001) 
0.4072 
(.0001) 
0.3535 
(.0001) 
 
Net In-
come/Sales  
  1.00 –0.0521 
(.0001) 
–0.1347 
(.0001) 
–0.2693 
(.0001) 
 
Prior Grant 
Vega/Sales 
   1.00 0.7003 
(.0001) 
0.3126 
(.0001) 
 
Portfolio 
Vega/Sales 
    1.00 0.5404 
(.0001) 
 
Prior Salary/ 
Sales  
     1.00 
       
Variable Definitions: 
Return= One-period raw return (fiscal year end (t) price per share / fiscal year end (t–1) price per share) 
BV/Sales = Book Value at (t) divided by Sales for time (t–1, t) 
NI/Sales = Net income per sales per dollar for time (t–1,t) 
Prior Grant Vega/ Sales = Sensitivity to equity risk of CEO options granted in year (t–1)), scaled by 
sales 
Portfolio Vega/ Sales = Sensitivity to equity risk of CEO stock & option portfolio at year-end (t–1)), 
scaled by sales 
Prior Salary / Sales = CEO salary in year (t–1), scaled by sales 
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Table 14 
Interaction Between Grant and Portfolio  
Sensitivity and Incentive Trend Status 
Dependent Variable One Period Return 
  
     
Independent Variables 
Predicted 
sign 
Coefficient 
estimate t value p-value 
Intercept  0.836 57.86 .0001 
BV / Sales  0.007 0.57 .5668 
NI / Sales  0.269 6.58 .0001 
POGSTER  –0.033 –0.83 .4044 
DEQIND    0.172 12.50 .0001 
POGSTER*POPSTER H4:  – 0.040 1.95 .0514 
DEQIND*POGSTER  0.072 1.03 .3014 
DEQIND*POPSTER  0.267 6.23 .0001 
DEQIND*POGSTER*POPSTER  –0.086       –2.17 .0300 
POGSTER * URW H5:   + 0.015 1.52 .1282 
     
Control Variables:     
POPSTER  –0.142 –6.35 .0001 
Uncorrelated Wealth (URW)  0.029 4.35 .0001 
     
N = 6158     
Adjusted R-squared .1519    
F Value 62.27    
Probability 0.0001       
      
Notes      
All continuous variable outliers are deleted at 1% and 99%. 
All t values are calculated on two-tail basis, even if hypothesis supports one-tail test. 
Coefficients on yearly indicator variables are suppressed. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Return = One-period raw return: fiscal year end (t) price per share/fiscal year end (t–1) price per 
share 
BV / Sales = Book value at year-end (t) / sales for year (t) 
NI / Sales = Net income in year (t) / sales in year (t) 
POGSTER = Sensitivity to Equity Risk of CEO Options granted in year (t–1) scaled by sales in year 
(t)  
POPSTER =  Sensitivity to equity risk of CEO stock and option portfolio at year-end (t–1) scaled by 
sales in year (t) 
URW (Uncorrelated Wealth) = CEO salary in year (t–1) scaled by sales in year (t) 
DISEQIND = indicator variable = 1 if firm exhibits disequilibrium in incentives (t–2,t+1), else = 0  
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Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5, that there is a significant positive relationship between the level 
of CEO salary, as a proxy for unrelated wealth, and the incentive and value impact of 
stock option grants, was supported by this research. Table 12 provides the results of 
statistical analysis of this hypothesis. The coefficient on the interaction between option 
grant sensitivity and uncorrelated wealth is positive and significant (t-statistic 3.71, p-
value .0002) As a main effect, unrelated wealth, using prior-period CEO salary as a 
proxy, was positively associated with firm value (t-statistic 3.55, p-value .0004). How-
ever, in the presence of higher CEO salary, the incentive impact of stock option com-
pensation is increased. Thus, the results of this study suggest that the inclusion of stock 
option incentives in the compensation program has a positive association with firm 
value, by adding risk-taking incentives to a compensation scheme that is heavily in-
sured. These findings are consistent with LLV, providing empirical support for their 
analysis of the interaction between stock option grant incentives and those provided by 
a CEO’s uncorrelated wealth. 
Summary 
This study found that stock option grants are not universally associated with 
firm value. However, the sensitivity of CEO stock option grants is positively associated 
with firm value for the sub-sample of firm-years that exhibit CEO incentive disequilib-
rium. This suggests that stock option grants which move the CEO’s portfolio of incen-
tives for risk-taking to a higher level (a situation labeled disequilibrium in this study) 
are value-enhancing for a firm. 
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Additional value in stock option sensitivity was found in the interaction be-
tween option grant incentives and high levels of unrelated CEO wealth. This analysis 
found that high sensitivity in option grants appears to mitigate lower risk-taking incen-
tives that could be generated by high levels of unrelated CEO wealth. This interaction 
was demonstrated to be associated with improved firm value.  
No significant interaction between grant sensitivity and portfolio sensitivity was 
found, overall. However, for the subset of firms that exhibit CEO incentive disequilib-
rium, a positive association with firm value was noted. 
Taken together, the findings in this study provide support for CEO incentive 
equilibrium as a factor that conditions the association between stock option grants and 
firm value. In addition, this study provides evidence in support of theoretical predic-
tions regarding the interaction between a CEO’s portfolio incentives and those embed-
ded in an option grant. 
The conclusions reached in this study, based on the model employed, assume 
efficient markets, and that disclosure of option grant information is effectively and ac-
curately impounded in stock price. The impact of stock option compensation was 
measured in this study by the expectations of managerial actions formed by investors 
on the basis of stock option grant disclosures and embedded in price. Future research 
into the level of transparency in stock option disclosure and recognition will be impor-
tant to increasing the knowledge of the valuation impact of stock option compensation. 
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 CHAPTER VII 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity of Results to Alternative Model Specifications 
The primary analyses presented in this paper have adopted a returns model for 
examining the relationship between stock option grant characteristics and firm value, 
and have applied ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis. The data consists of panel data, 
where multiple observations are present for a large number of firms over a long series 
of timeframes, in this case, fiscal years. In such a data set, there is potential for residu-
als to be correlated over time, over firm, or both. Correlation in residuals is a violation 
of OLS assumptions, the consequence of which is biased estimators and unreliable in-
ferences based on these estimators. There are a number of approaches that have been 
used in accounting and finance literature to address panel data. This study applies some 
of these approaches as sensitivity analyses, to test whether the inferences presented in 
the primary results of this study are sensitive to these adjustments for potential correla-
tion in residuals.27 
____________ 
27 Petersen (2006) examines these methods and evaluates their applicability to specific dataset conditions.. 
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Table 15 
Fama Macbeth Regressions: Hypothesis 1 & 2 
Dependent variable 
H1 
Price (t) 
H1 
Return (t–1,t) 
H2 
Price (t) 
H2 
Return (t–1,t) 
Independent variables     
Intercept 25.670 
(< .0001) 
1.066 
(< .0001) 
25.385 
(< .0001) 
1.051 
(< .0001) 
 
BV / Sales –0.167 
(.6410) 
–0.004 
(.4358) 
–0.134 
(.6217) 
0.008 
(.3675) 
 
NI / Sales 37.956 
(<.0001) 
0.329 
(<.0001) 
36.633 
(< .0001) 
0.299 
(.0003) 
 
Prior Grant Indicator (POGIND) 3.990 
(<.0001) 
–0.005 
(< .6906) 
1.093 
(.0184) 
–0.079 
(.9999) 
 
Disequilibrium Indicator (DEQIND)  
 
 0.924 
(.0219) 
0.036 
(.0553) 
 
POGIND * DEQIND  
 
 4.908 
(< .0001) 
0.132 
(< .0001) 
     
N – Total Sample Size 12,987 12,975 12,986 12,975 
N(max) – Maximum annual sample size 1,718 1,727 1,718 1,727 
N(min) – Minimum annual sample size 1,473 1,461 1,473 1,461 
Average Adjusted R-squared .093 .018 .106 .039 
     
Notes     
For each independent variable in this analysis, the top figure is the mean coefficient from 8 annual 
regressions between 1994 and 2001. The second number (in parentheses) is the p-value from a two-
sided test that this mean coefficient is different from zero. The standard deviation used in this t-test 
is that of the 8 annual coefficients. Year indicator variables are suppressed. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Return (t–1, t) =  One-period raw return:  Fiscal Year End (t) price per share / Fiscal Year End (t–1) 
price per share  
Price (t) = Fiscal Year End (t) price per share 
BV / Sales = Book Value at year-end (t) / Sales $ in year (t) 
NI / Sales = Net Income per Sales $ in year (t) 
POGIND: Indicator = 1 if firm grants CEO options in (t–1), else = 0 
DEQIND:  Indicator = 1 if firm is in incentive disequilibrium for year-end  (t–2 to t+1), else = 0 
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Fama Macbeth regression was used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 in the presence 
of potential correlated residuals. Fama MacBeth regression is applicable to datasets 
where there is low firm-specific persistence (Petersen 2006), and this is expected to be 
the case for a returns model where the independent variables are primarily dichotomous 
indicator variables. Table 15 presents the results of Fama MacBeth analysis of Hy-
potheses 1 and 2.28 The results in Table 15 for the returns models are generally consis-
tent with results presented in Table 7 with respect to sign and significance of 
coefficients. Table 8 and Table 15 differ in significance (but not sign) for the variable 
POGIND. No specific prediction was made for the sign on this variable, however, an 
expectation of non-significance was maintained, a priori. While this difference between 
Table 8 and Table 15 is notable, it is not part of the formal hypothesis. Therefore, the 
results presented in this study for Hypotheses 1 and 2 appear to be robust to Fama 
Macbeth correction for time-series correlation. 
Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) suggest enriching studies by testing both price 
and returns models, This study tests Hypotheses 1 and 2 as price models analyzed us-
ing Fama Macbeth regressions. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 15 
alongside the results of the Fama Macbeth regressions for the returns model. Interpreta-
tion of price models is slightly different from that for returns models. The price model 
measures the level of the dependent variable at the end of the return period, while the 
return model measures the change in the dependent variable over the return period. 
Since option grants may be considered a “flow,” measuring their impact with a “stock” 
____________ 
28 The Fama Macbeth procedure used in this study follows Bushee and Noe (2000). 
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measure is problematic. There are many potential omitted variables that comprise the 
“stock” measure which were generated in periods before the return is measured. In tests 
of Hypothesis 1, while returns are not noted to be associated with prior option grants, 
price is significantly and positively associated with an option grant in the immediately 
prior period (coefficient = 1.093, p-value = .0184) The coefficient estimates are many 
orders of magnitude larger in the price level model versus those in the returns model.   
Price-level tests of Hypotheses 3 through 5 are executed by computing Rogers 
standard errors. Rogers standard errors are a method of correcting for correlated errors, 
using year-specific indicator variables and clustering on firm, as suggested by Petersen 
(2006). The results of these analyses are presented in Table 16. The variables of inter-
est are common in their sign and significance between Table 12, the base (returns) 
model, and Table 16, the price level model.  
 73 
Table 16 
Price Level Regressions: Hypotheses 3, 4, & 5 
Dependent variable 
 
H 3 
Price (t)  
H 4&5 
Price (t) 
Independent variables 
Predicted 
Sign Rogers SE 
Predicted 
Sign Rogers SE 
Intercept 
 
 
25.541 
(< .0001)  
26.258 
(< .0001) 
BV / Sales 
 
 
3.687 
(<.0001)  
3.615 
(<.0001) 
NI / Sales 
 
30.658 
(<.0001)  
 
33.424 
(< .0001) 
 
POGSTER 
  
–9.411 
(< .0001)  
 
–9.664 
(<.0001) 
POPSTER: 
 
 
5.354 
(<.0001)  
 
4.481 
(.0005) 
URW:  Uncorrelated Wealth 
 
–4.399 
(<.0001)  
 
–5.304 
(.0008) 
 
DEQIND * POGSTER 
 
+ 
 
13.881 
<.0001)   
 
POGSTER * POPSTER 
   
- 
 
–0.119 
(.9282) 
 
POGSTER * URW 
   
+ 
 
3.248 
(.0108) 
Number of observations  6090  6090 
Number of clusters  1623  1623 
Adjusted R-squared  .1614  .1601 
     
Notes     
For  each variable in the model, the top figure is the  regression coefficient, while the second number (in 
parentheses) is the p-value from a two-sided test that this coefficient is different from zero. Year indicator 
variables are suppressed. 
Variable Definitions: 
Price (t) = Fiscal Year End (t) price per share 
BV / Sales = Book Value at year-end (t) / Sales $ in year (t) 
NI / Sales = Net Income per Sales $ in year (t) 
DEQIND:  Indicator = 1 if firm is in incentive disequilibrium for year-end  (t–2 to t+1), else = 0 
URW: Uncorrelated Wealth = CEO Salary in year (t–1) scaled by sales in year (t) 
POGSTER:  Sensitivity to Equity Risk of CEO Options granted in year (t–1) scaled by sales in year (t) 
POPSTER =  Sensitivity to Equity Risk of CEO Portfolio at year-end (t–1) scaled by sales in year (t) 
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Sensitivity of Results to Analysis Based on Size-Adjusted Returns 
The basic analysis in this research employed raw returns as a dependent vari-
able. Additional analysis was performed to examine the sensitivity of results to size-
adjusted returns. The sensitivity of its result to size-adjusted returns, based on the 
CRSP universe decile returns was examined. Table 17 presents the results of  tests of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 when returns are size-adjusted. Table 18 presents the results of 
tests of Hypotheses 3 through 5 when returns are measured as size-adjusted. These re-
sults are qualitatively the same as those in the primary analysis, thus the study’s results 
are not sensitive to using size-adjusted returns instead of raw returns. 
Sensitivity of Results to Influential Variables 
The main results of this study were computed using data where outlying vari-
able observations were deleted at the 1% and 99% levels. The distribution of firm and 
option sensitivity data is  highly skewed, however, as can be noted in Table 6. The 1% 
and 99% levels did not capture all of the influential variables as measured by DFFITS 
and studentized residuals. As an additional sensitivity analysis, the research hypotheses 
were tested with a dataset that, in addition to the 1% and 99% cutoffs, excluded influ-
ential observations as defined by DFFITS and studentized residuals in excess of 2. The 
results of these analyses (untabulated) show that the inferences from the primary re-
sults of the study are essentially unchanged by the exclusion of the additional influen-
tial variables. This provides evidence that the results are not driven by influential 
variables. 
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Table 17 
Size-adjusted Return Regressions: Hypotheses 1 & 2 
Dependent variable  
H 1 
Adj. Return (t)  
H 2 
Adj. Return (t) 
Independent variables 
Predicted 
Sign  
Predicted 
Sign  
Intercept 
 
 
–0.057 
(< .0001)  
 
–0.038 
(< .0015) 
BV / Sales 
 
 
–0.010 
(.1640)  
 
–0.005 
(.5407) 
NI / Sales 
 
 
0.386 
(<.0001)  
0.353 
(<.0001) 
 
POGIND 
 
+ 
 
–0.011 
( .2088) 
 
 
–0.085 
( <.0001) 
DEQIND 
   
 
0.032 
(.0248) 
POGINT = POGIND * DEQIND 
  
+ 
 
 
0.148 
(<.0001) 
     
F-test:     β  (POGIND) + β (POGINT) = 0   
 
+ 
 
.063 
(<.0001) 
     
Number of observations  12,260  12,260 
p-value  <.0001  <.0001 
Adjusted R-squared  .0792  .0792 
     
Notes          
For  each variable in the model, the top figure is the  regression coefficient, while the second number (in paren-
theses) is the p-value from a two-sided test that this coefficient is different from zero. Year indicator variables 
are suppressed. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Price (t) = Fiscal Year End (t) price per share 
BV / Sales = Book Value at year-end (t) / Sales $ in year (t) 
NI / Sales = Net Income per Sales $ in year (t) 
DEQIND:  Indicator = 1 if firm is in incentive disequilibrium for year-end  (t–1 to t+1), else = 0 
POGIND: Indicator = 1 if firm grants CEO options in (t–1), else = 0 
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Table 18 
Size-adjusted Return Regressions: Hypotheses 3, 4, & 5 
Dependent variable 
 
H 3 Adj.  
Return (t)  
H 4&5 Adj. 
Return (t) 
Independent variables Predicted 
Sign  
Predicted 
Sign  
Intercept 
 
 
0.916 
(< .0001)  
0.920 
(< .0001) 
BV / Sales 
 
 
0.006 
(.6963)  
0.006 
(.6894) 
NI / Sales 
 
0.314 
(<.0001)  
 
0.361 
(< .0001) 
 
POGSTER 
  
–0.118 
( .0010)  
 
–0.004 
(.9186) 
 
POPSTER: 
 
–.090 
(<.0001)  
 
–0.124 
(.0005) 
URW:  Uncorrelated Wealth 
 
0.033 
(<.0001)  
 
0.028 
(.0009) 
 
DEQIND * POGSTER 
 
+ 
 
0.524 
<.0001)   
 
POGSTER * POPSTER 
   
– 
 
0.002 
(.9252) 
 
POGSTER * URW 
   
+ 
 
0.037 
(.0021) 
     
Number of observations  5278  5278 
p-value  <.0001  <.0001 
Adjusted R-squared  .0948  .0737 
Notes   
For  each variable in the model, the top figure is the  regression coefficient, while the second number (in paren-
theses) is the p-value from a two-sided test that this coefficient is different from zero. Year indicator variables 
are suppressed. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
Price (t) = Fiscal Year End (t) price per share 
BV / Sales = Book Value at year-end (t) / Sales $ in year (t) 
NI / Sales = Net Income per Sales $ in year (t) 
DEQIND:  Indicator = 1 if firm is in incentive disequilibrium for year-end  (t–2 to t+1), else = 0 
URW: Uncorrelated Wealth = CEO Salary in year (t–1) scaled by sales in year (t) 
POGSTER:  Sensitivity to Equity Risk of CEO Options granted in year (t–1) scaled by sales in year (t) 
POPSTER =  Sensitivity to Equity Risk of CEO Portfolio at year-end (t–1) scaled by sales in year (t) 
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Sensitivity of Results to Alternate Measure of Equilibrium 
The primary results are based on measuring equilibrium in CEO incentives 
based on sensitivity of the CEOs portfolio to equity risk. This is consistent with the 
definition of portfolio optimality defined by Core and Guay (1999). Since the focus of 
this study, however, are the CEO’s incentives for risk-taking, it seems reasonable to 
examine the impact on the results of the study if equilibrium is measured in terms of 
sensitivity to equity risk. Additional analysis of this data (untabulated) using sensitivity 
to equity risk to define equilibrium status shows that the results are qualitatively the 
same when the alternate measure of equilibrium is used. Thus the results of the study 
are not dependent on whether equilibrium in CEO incentives is defined in terms of sen-
sitivity to equity risk or sensitivity to stock price. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study found no universal positive association between option grants and 
firm value. It did find, however, that conditions surrounding the relationship between 
grants,  grant sensitivity, and CEO incentive equilibrium influence the association be-
tween the grants and firm value. The positive association between grants and firm 
value was not evidenced in the sub-sample of data for firms in CEO incentive equilib-
rium. This indicates that the valuation impact of stock option grants is highest for firms 
that do not demonstrate incentive equilibrium, but rather demonstrate a trend of in-
creasing CEO portfolio sensitivity to stock price.  
High CEO portfolio sensitivity is not found to interact with grant sensitivity in a 
manner that reduces firm value. Thus, this study did not find support for the hypothesis 
that grants further reduce CEO diversification, and interact with portfolio sensitivity to 
reduce incentives for risk-taking. However, consistent with LLV, high levels of unre-
lated wealth are found to interact with grant sensitivity so as to increase the positive 
impact of grant sensitivity on firm value.  
Future contributions in this area should include consideration of additional, 
firm-specific factors that may mitigate or enhance the incentive impact of option 
grants. These firm-specific factors may have an impact through their association with 
CEO incentive equilibrium. One firm-specific factor that may be of high importance is 
firm strategy, since the impact of option grants in a “build” strategy firm is likely dif-
 79 
ferent from that of option grants in a “harvest” or “hold” strategy firm. The nature of 
the grants awarded as well as the optimal level of risk-taking incentives likely differs 
between these types of firms.  
Study of the incentives embodied in option grants presumes that executives re-
ceiving these grants understand their implications fully, or at a minimum, have a heu-
ristic method available to assess the value of the option with respect to stock return 
volatility. There is some question regarding the validity of this assumption. Hall (1998) 
suggested that the changes in option value that accompany changes in firm value are 
understood poorly by CEOs, as well as boards of directors and academics. This jeop-
ardizes the strength of claims about the effectiveness of stock option incentives. The 
sample in this study is restricted to CEOs, thus presuming a high level of financial so-
phistication and mitigating the risk of incentive failure due to incomprehension. How-
ever, the limitation posed by this risk is inherent in this study. It points to the 
importance of future research that investigates the level of understanding on the part of 
CEOs and compensation committees of the complexities of stock option compensation. 
LLV (1991) highlighted the importance of executive risk-aversion on the incen-
tive value of a compensation contract. This study is limited in that it assumes a re-
stricted range of risk preferences among CEOs, and excludes this variable from the 
analysis, since measurement of this variable is beyond the scope of this research pro-
ject. 
The majority of option grants are awarded with a strike price equal to the mar-
ket price of the stock on the day of the grant. A small proportion of grants is issued at a 
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premium, with the strike price of the option exceeding the market price of the stock. 
Future research on the incentives generated by these options, labeled “performance op-
tions,” as differentiated from in-the-money options that comprise the majority of 
grants, will provide valuable additional insight into the effectiveness of option grants. 
Gerakos et al. (2005) are pursuing preliminary work in this area. This research requires 
further investigation of the functional form of the relationship between existing meas-
ures of option incentives and output measures. The line of research is closely linked to 
a second important area for future research, incentive remedies for options on stocks 
that lose significant value.  
The existence of non-contractual repricing actions associated with options that 
become “underwater” is not addressed by the incentive analysis in this paper. Repric-
ing is aimed at retention incentives; the option incentives investigated in this paper are 
targeted at risk-taking. In theory, any ex-post repricing that occurs is not part of an ex-
ante contract. As such, it may have little incentive impact. Alternatively, if a CEO is 
aware of a non-zero probability of repricing, this awareness likely has an incentive im-
pact, possibly as a moderating influence on risk-aversion. The incentive impact of non-
contractual repricing and other remedies for options that become worthless over time is 
unclear.29 It is an interesting direction for future research. 
Consistent with related studies, e.g., Hanlon et al. (2003), the findings of this 
study depend on model specification. Fundamental research that further develops em-
____________ 
29 In lieu of repricing, some companies make additional grants at the lower stock price, replace options with re-
stricted stock, cancel options and replace them at least six months later, buy out options with cash, and/or allow 
employees to sell options to a third party at a negotiated price. 
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pirical models of the relationship between compensation and its effects on the firm will 
add significantly to future studies in this area.  
Barth and Clinch (2001) show that industry controls influence the predictive 
power of the Ohlson valuation model using a 15-industry classification scheme. Analy-
sis of the results of this study (untabulated) controlling for these 15 industries does not 
change the inferences taken from the base returns model. However, it seems reasonable 
to expect that there would be some industries for which the noted determinants of op-
tion effectiveness would be relatively more influential. Further investigation of indus-
try differences in option grant effectiveness is a promising direction for future research. 
The impact of backdating on grant sensitivity and the evolution of CEO portfo-
lio incentives over time will be an important area for future research. Recent publicity 
surrounding the backdating and springloading of option grants has renewed questions 
about compensation committee effectiveness. Heron and Lie (2006) document a sub-
stantial reduction in abnormal patterns of stock returns surrounding option grants fol-
lowing the implementation of a 2002 SEC requirement that option grants be disclosed 
within two business days. Previously, a 45-day disclosure period was in effect. The re-
duced reporting period allows less opportunity for backdating and therefore has impli-
cations for option grant sensitivity. An extension of this dissertation is in progress that 
extends the timeframe of the sample to incorporate data following implementation of 
the 2002 SEC accelerated disclosure requirement. This will enable investigation of the 
changes in grant sensitivity and the relationship between grant sensitivity and firm 
value that took place as a result of the change in the disclosure requirement. Other   
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studies that evaluate the impact of this change on CEO incentives will contribute addi-
tional understanding of the value of stock option compensation. 
While stock option compensation to CEOs has abated somewhat, stock option 
compensation to directors is increasing. Byard and Li (2005) found that between 1992 
and 1996, stock option compensation represented an average of 16% of director’s pay. 
Between 1996 and 2002, option grants averaged 46% of directors’ pay. Instead of 
aligning directors’ interests with that of shareholders, Byard and Li suggest that the 
options may align directors’ pay with that of managers against the shareholders. Fur-
ther research to define these relationships and identify conflicts will contribute signifi-
cantly to governance research.  
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Description 
 
Return (t–1, t) 
 
Price per share at (t) / Price per share at (t–1) 
 
D95 – D01 
 
Indicator variables to create separate intercepts for 1994 – 2001 
observations 
 
BV/Sales(t) 
 
Book Value(t) scaled by sales in year t 
 
NI/Sales(t) 
 
Net Income(t) scaled by sales in year t 
 
POGSTER(t) 
 
Prior year (t–1) option grant sensitivity to equity risk 
 
POGIND(t) 
 
Indicator variable = 1 if options were granted in prior year (t–
1), else = 0 
 
DEQIND(t) 
 
Indicator variable = 1 if firm demonstrates incentive disequilib-
rium, 
Else=0 
 
POPSTER(t) 
 
Prior year option portfolio sensitivity to equity risk 
 
Uncorrelated 
Wealth(t) 
(URW) 
 
Prior year CEO salary scaled by sales 
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APPENDIX B 
BLACK-SCHOLES OPTION PRICING MODEL 
The Black-Scholes formula for valuing European call options, as modified to account for dividend pay-
outs (Merton, 1973) is presented below. 
 
 
Option Value = [S e–dT N(Z) – X e–rT N(Z – σT(1/2))] 
 
 
Where: 
 
Z = [ ln( S / X) + T ( r–d + σ2 / 2)] / σT(1/2) 
 
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
 
S = price of underlying stock 
 
X = exercise price of the option 
 
σ = expected stock return volatility over the life of the option 
 
r = log of risk-free interest rate 
 
T = time to maturity of the option in years 
 
d = log of expected dividend yield over the life of the option 
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APPENDIX C  
COMPUTATION OF VARIABLES 
B.1. Estimating the sensitivity of an option grant to stock-return volatility. (Core and Guay, 2002) 
 
1. Gather data on CEO option grants from most recent proxy statement, or 
Execucomp: 
(i) number of options, (ii) exercise price, (iii) time to maturity 
2. Gather other parameters from  CRSP, Compustat, or other source. 
 
[∂(option value)/∂(stock volatility) * (0.01) = e–dT N’(Z) S T (1/2) * (0.01) 
 
 Where parameters are as defined in the Black-Scholes model (APPENDIX B). 
 
 
B.2. Estimating the sensitivity of an option grant to stock price (Core and Guay, 2002) 
 
1. Gather data on CEO option grants from most recent proxy statement or 
Execucomp: 
(i) number of options, (ii) exercise price, (iii) time to maturity 
2. Gather other parameters from  CRSP, Compustat, or other source. 
 
[∂(option value)/∂(price) * (price/100) = e–dT N(Z) *  (price / 100) 
   
Where parameters are as defined in the Black-Scholes model (APPENDIX B). 
 
 
B.3. Estimating the sensitivity of an option portfolio to stock-return volatility (Core & 
Guay, 2002) 
 
1. Gather data on CEO option portfolio from most recent proxy statements 
or Execucomp: 
(i) number of exercisable and unexercisable options outstanding 
(ii) current realizable value of exercisable and unexercisable options 
2. Compute exercise prices as follows: 
a. compute average exercise price for exercisable options as S – (cur-
rent realizable value of exercisable options/ # exercisable options) 
b. compute average exercise price for unexercisable options as S – 
(current realizable value of unexercisable options/ # unexercisable 
options) 
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3. Compute time-to-maturity as follows: 
a.  of unexercisable options equal to one year less than time-to-
maturity of current year’s grant (or nine years if no new grant was 
made) 
b. of exercisable options equal to three years less than time-to-maturity 
of unexercisable options (or six years if no new grant was made)  
4. Compute fiscal year end sensitivity of CEO option portfolio to stock-
return volatility as in (B.1), using aggregate sensitivities of exercisable 
and unexercisable options as computed in (B.3, steps 2 and 3). 
 
 
B.4. Estimating the sensitivity of an option portfolio to stock price (Core & Guay, 
2002). 
1. Gather data on CEO option portfolio from most recent proxy statements 
or Execucomp: 
(i) number of exercisable and unexercisable options outstanding 
(ii) current realizable value of exercisable and unexercisable options 
2. Compute exercise prices as follows: 
a. compute average exercise price for exercisable options as  
S – (current realizable value of exercisable options/ # exercisable 
options) 
b. compute average exercise price for unexercisable options as  
S – (current realizable value of unexercisable options/ # unexercis-
able options) 
3. Compute time-to-maturity as follows: 
a.  of unexercisable options equal to one year less than time-to-
maturity of current year’s grant (or nine years if no new grant was 
made) 
b. of exercisable options equal to three years less than time-to-maturity 
of unexercisable options (or six years if no new grant was made)  
4. Compute fiscal year end sensitivity of CEO option portfolio to stock 
price as in using aggregate sensitivities of exercisable and unexercisable 
options as computed in (B.4, steps 2 and 3). 
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